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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2658 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERR.OR. 
To the Honoraple the Chief Justice and f.he Associate Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
About 5 :20 o'clock P. :M:., January 8, 1941, a northbound 
street car owned and operated by Virginia Electric and Power 
Company upon which Benjamin F. Goodgon was a passenger, 
was struck and knocked off the track at the intersection of 
Lafayette Street and Patterson .. Avenue in the City of Rich· 
mond by an eastbound automobile owned and ope1·ated by 
Francis X. Thompson (Exhillit, Transcript, p. 85). 
2* *Goodson subsequently instituted action in Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, against 
both Virginia Electric and Power Company and Thompson, 
seeking recovery of $25~000.00 for personal injuries allegedly 
sustained bv him through the concurring· neg·ligence of both 
the operator of the street car and Thompson i the action be-
ing entitled Benjamin F. Goodson v. Jlirgima Electric and 
Power Company an.d Francis X. Thompson (Exhibit, Tran-
script). 
Thompson was ae~ompanied by hi~ wife, Marjorie Thomp-
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
son, when the collision occurred, and she instituted action 
ag·ainst Virginia Eleetric and Power Company in Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, seeking recovery of 
$5,000.00 for personal injuries allegedly sustained by her 
through the negligence of the. operator of the street car; 
the action being entitled Marjorie Thompson v. Virginia 
Electric and Power Compa.ny (Affidayi.t of Messrs. E. R. 
Williams, T. Justin Moore, Norman L. Flippen and Archi-
bald ,G. Robertson). 
Petitioner, Archibald G. Robertson, respectfully repre-
sents tha.t he is aggrieved by a final judgment entered dur-
ing trial of the aforesaid action entitled Benja,min F. Good-
son v. Vir.qinia Electric and Power Company and Francis X. 
Thompson, in L.aw and Equity Court of t11e City of Rich-
moncl, Part Two, on the 13th day of Febrnary, 1942, as 
follows: 
''For his contempt in refusing to obey the order of this 
Court this day while a witness on the stand, A. G. Robertson,. 
an attorney duly qualified and Iicen~ed to practice in this 
Court and as such an officer of this Court, is fined the sum 
of one hundred dollars and the Clerk of this Court is di-
rected to collect the said sum and aecount for it as the law 
directs.'' 
3* "The fore going judgment was entered upon refusal 
of petitioner to disclose to counsel for Goodson a writ-
ten statement of a witness which petitioner alleged was a 
privileged communication whfoh was inadmissible in evi-
dence under Srction 6216 of the Code of Virginia, and had 
been disclosed to him as counsel for Virginia Elechic and 
Power Company (Record, pp. 5, 7-8). 
The judgment was entered over petitioner's objection and 
exception (Record, p. 2), and the Court refused petitioner's 
request to give bond with s11rety pending· appeal by peti-
tioner from the fine (R.ecord, pp. 2-3), and directed payment 
of t.l1e fine (Record, pp. 4, 11). Petitioner accordingly pa.id 
the fine under protest and subject to exception on February 
13, 1942 (Hecord, pp. 2-3). 
Petitiorter is advised that imposition of the fine was un-
warranted and illeg-nl, and constitutes reversible error to 
his prejudice, and petitioner therefore prayR for a writ of 
error and for exonerntion and relief from said fine pursuant 
to Sect.ion 4932 of tlle Code of Virginia. . 
The Trial Court declined to sign a Certificate of I~xcep-
tions in whicl1 courn~el for petitioner sought to l1ave the 
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Court include in the record of this contempt proceeding a 
transcript of the evidence and all proceeding·s upon trial of 
the action entitled Benjmi1.in F. Good.~on v. Virgin·ia Electric 
a,nd Power Company and Francis X. Thompson, together 
with all exl1ibits introduced in evidence and all instructions 
given and refused upon the trial of that case when the afore-
said fine was imposed (Affidavit of Norman L. Flippen). 
Counsel for petitioner contended in the Trial Court 
4• *and submit now that transcript of the evidence and all 
proceeding·s upon trial of the action entitled Benjamin 
F. Goodson v. Virginia Rlectric and Power Company a.nd 
Francis X. Thompson, together with all exhibits introduced 
in evidence and all instructions Q;iv:en and refused upon the 
trial of that case are pertinent to thiR proceeding and should 
have been included in the record of this proceeding; but 
the Trial Court ruled tbat the transcript and all. the instruc-
tions and all the exhibits were irrelevant to this proceeding 
and upon that theory ~xcludecl tl1e transcript and the in-
struetions and all the exhibits from the record of this pro-
ceeding. 
Copy of the Certificate of Exceptions which the Trial 
Court refused to sign and copieR of tl1e Transcript, Exhibits 
and Instructions excluded from the record are submitted 
herewith as exhibits with this petition; the Certificate of 
Exceptions being marked Certificate fJ,f PJxceptions Tendered 
to the Trial Court; the transcript being marked Exhibit 
Transcript; the E:xJ1ibits being marked collectively Copies 
of Ali Exhibits Introduced in Evidence; and the Instructions 
being marked collectiveJy Exhibit Instructions. 
The Trial Court eventually signed a Certificate of Excep-
tions in form satisfactory to it, and manusc.ript copy of the 
record made up pursuant to that Certificate of Exceptions is 
submitted herewith, with copies of additional Exhibit #1 
·and Exllibit #2, which we-r·e filed anrl made a part of the rec-
ord pursuant to said Certifi~ate of Exceptions. 
5"' *R.eference is made in this petition to the Exhibits 
herewith and to the manuscript record made up pursu-
ant to the Certificate of Exceptions which the Trial Court 
signed; all references to the Certificate of Exceptions whic.11 
the Trial Court refused to sig11 being clesigna ted by the words 
''Ccrtifh-ate of Exception.R Snbm.iftecl to the Trial C01trt;'' 
al] references to the Transcript being· inclica.tecl by the word 
"Transcript." followed by appropriate page numbers; a.ll 
references to the Exllibits excluded from the record being 
indicated by the word "Pxhibit," followed br the desig:na-
tion used to identify the particular exhibit when it was in-
troduced in evidence; all ref ercnces to the Instructions being 
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indicated by the word '' Instruction," followed by the desig-
nation used to identify the particular instruction in the Trial 
Court; all references to the record being· indicated by the 
word ''Record," followed by appropriate pnge numbers; 
and all refer~nces to Exhibit #1 and Exhibit #2 with the 
reco.rd being designated respectively by the words "Exhibit 
#1 ivith Record,'' and ''Exhibit #!2 with Record.'' 
Counsel for petitioner also submit herewith affidavit of 
Norman L. Flippen setting forth the facts incident to refusal 
of the Trial Court to sign the Certificate of Exceptions sub-
mitted to the T'rial Court; and affidavit of Messrs. E. R. Wil-
liams, T. Justin Moore, Norman L. Flippen and .Archibald 
G. Robertson, declaring .that consideration upon appeal of 
this proceeding of the Certificate of Exceptions which the 
Trial Court refused to sign and consideration of the Tran-
script, lDxhibits and Instructions which the Trial Court 
6* excluded from the record of ':fthis proceeding will ma-
terially aid the Appellate Court in adjudication of this 
proceeding·; and counsel for petitioner accordingly request 
the Court of Appeals to consider the aforesaid Certificate 
of Exceptions, Transcript, Exhibits ancl Instructions . 
.A.s appears from the affidavit of Messrs. "Williams, Moore, 
Flippen and Robertson, the CertificatP- of Exceptions which 
the Trial Court refused to sign is Rubmitted herewith, and 
as appears also from said affidavit, the Tra.ns~ript, Exhibits 
and Instructions which the T1-ial Court excluded from the 
record of this proceeding are lodged among the orig'inal 
papers in the action entitled Benjamin F. Goodson, v. Vir-
(jini,a Electric mid Pou.,er CompanJJ and Francis X. Thomp-
son, now pending· upon appeal by Virg-inia Electric and Power 
Company from Law and Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Part Two, from judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
ag;ainst Virginia. Electric and Power Company, and in favoi.· 
of the def enda.nt Francis .X. Thompson; and said Transcript, 
Exhibits and Instructions are therefore available to the 
Court of Appeals upon writ of c.erfiorari from the Court 
of Appeals to Law and Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mn.nd, Part Two. 
THE PROCEFJDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
In the aforesaid action entitled Benia·niin F. Goodso'Jl, v. 
Virginia. Electric and Power Compa,,i.v and Fmncis X. 
Thompson, both defendants denied lfability, iu1d the case 
was tried before Honorable Frank T. Sutton, Jr., and a jury 
February 12-13, 1942 (Record, p. 2). 
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7* • According to· the testimony for the plaintiff, the 
street car approached Patterson A venue northbound at 
.a speed of ten or fifteen miles per hour, and without stopping 
continued into the crossing at about the same speed {Tran-
script, p. 17), when the eastbound automobile was approach-
ing the crossing at a speed of approximately forty miles 
-per hour, only a short distance away (Transcript, pp. 15-17). 
Goodson himself had given a signed st.atement to the Vir-
ginia Electric a.nd Power Company in which he placed the 
blame for the collision entirely upon the defendant, Thomp-
son and exonerated the operator of the street car (Exhibit, 
VEP #1); but Goodson repudiated his statement at the 
trial, and testified in effect that the collision was clue to the 
concurring negligence of both the operator of the street car 
a.nd T)hompson (Transcript, pp. 17-28). 
According- to the defendant Virginia Electric -and Power 
Company, fhe street car stopped at Patterson Avenue and 
discharged a passenger, and then started over the crossing· 
when the approaching· automobile was a block or more away 
{Transcript, pp. 85, 156, 165-6); and passengers upon the 
~ar thoug·ht the driver of the automobile would stop and 
yield the rig·ht of way to the street car {Transcript, pp. 156-7, 
169, 170-2, 181-2, 184, 187, 195-6, 200-1, 207, 214-216, 220, 
222, 225, 228, 231-2). 
Virginia Electrfo and Power Company contended also that 
skid marks made by the automobile in Patterson Avenue; and 
marks made by the wheels of the street car in the paving of 
Patterson A venue after the street car was knocked off 
8* the track; ancl the *character of the damage to the auto-
mobile and the damage to the street ear; and the force 
-of the impact of the automobile into the side of the street 
1'ar all collectivelv demonstrate that the automobile was 
traveling at terrific speed when it struck the Rtreet car, and 
that the front of the street car was then approximately half-
way across Patterson Avenue (Exhibit VEP #3; Exhibit 
VEP #4; Exhibit VEP #5; Exhibit VEP #6; Exhibit 
VEP #7; Exhibit VEP #8; Exhibit VEP #9; Transcript, 
pp. 103-116, 128-134). 
The skid marks from the right wheels of the automobile 
were 48' 10" in lengih, and the skid marks from the left 
wheels of the automobile were 38' 10'' in length (Transcript, 
pp. 135-6, 147-8); and when the automobile struck the street 
r.ar it knocked the steel c1ulssis of the street car approxi-
mately 11" out of alignment (Transcri:.pt, pp. 107, 108, 110-
111). 
Virginia Electric and Power Company contended that 
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Goodson exaggerated his injuries (Transcript, pp. 10, 21, 
27-8) and the Company sought to discredit him upon his tes-
timony regarding the occurrence of the collision and also 
regarding the nature and extent of his injuries (Transcript, 
·pp. 14-32, 35-39) 45-6, 70-78, 84-252)_. 
The street car operator made a signed statement January 
8, 1941, to the effect that he stopped at Patterson Avenue and 
discharg·ed a passenger; and that as he did not then see any 
traffic within a block, he started the car, and as the front of 
the car entered the crossing he saw the automobile traveling 
at a fast rate of speed, about fortv feet from the car (Ex-
hibit #1 with Record). Notations upon the back of the 
9• statement are ~obviously office notations which are privi-
leged. 
On J a.nuary 10, 1941 (Exhibit #2 with Record) the op-
erator of the street ear made another statement to the ef-
fect tha.t when the Rtreet car was about one-third across 
Patterson Avenue he saw the automobile coming- at a rapid 
rate of speed; the statement failing to indicate how far away 
from the car the automobile was when the operator of the 
car first saw it. 
The operator of tlle car testified at the trial that he 
stopped and discharged a passenger at Patterson A venue, 
and then proceeded into Patterson Avenue (T·ranscript, p. 
85) ;1 and that when the car was twelve or fifteen feet out into 
the crossing he saw the automobile approaching at exces-
sive speed, approximately half a block awa.y (Transcript, 
pp. 86, 91, 94, 98, 1.01). Passengers on the car corroborated 
the testimony of the operator (Transcript, pp. 155-232). 
According to the operator, he immediately threw the car 
into emergency; and when the front of the car was about at 
the center of Patterson A venue, the automobile struck it 
and Imocked it off tho track (Transcript, pp. 85, 91-2). 
T. G. Vau~·han, an employee of Vfrgima Electric and 
Power Company, testi:ffod he had attempted without success 
to locate the passrnger wl10 alip:bted at Patterson Avenue, 
and explained the failure of the Company to produce the 
passenger as a witness (Transcript, pp. 233-4). 
Upon cross examination by counsel for Goodson, Vaughan 
was asked if he had the orig-inal statement made by the op-
erator of the car (Trmu.;cript, p. 2:35), and Vaug·lmn 
10* replied that lie did uot. ~have the statement or know 
where it was (Transcript, p. 235, U.ecorcl, pp. 6-7). 
Thereupon petitioner) ~.s counsel for Virginia Electric and 
Power Company, stated to coun~el for Goodson that he had 
the statement, but that he ·would not gfre it to counsel for 
Goodson, and thereby let counsel for Goodson prove his case 
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from the file of counsel for Virginia Electric and Power 
Company ( Transcript, p. 2B5). ·'"" 
Counsel for Goodson thereupon called petitioner to the 
Rt.and as an adverse witness and questioned him as follows 
(Transcript, p. 236): 
"Q. You are Mr. Archie Robertson, counsel for the de-
fendant Virginia Electric & Power Company in this· case 1 
' 'A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. Do you have the motorman 'R original statement in 
the file before vou? 
"A y .. 
. es, sir. 
"Q. ·wm you produce it and lot me ~ee it? 
"A. No, sir, because I have a duty to my client and also 
you have no leg·al right to call upon me for it and I consider 
that unfair practice an<l I will not :.dve it to you.'' 
Counsel for Goorlson rcquost~cl to be heard upon the issue 
raised; and after the jul'y had heen excluded from the court-
room the following argument ensue<l (Transcript, pp. 237-
243): 
11 * * (A. G. Robertson-Direct) Crranscript, p. 237) : 
''Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, this is the state-
ment of the witness in the case who is the factor of the de-
fendant and he has stated that he made the same statement 
in the original statement tl1at the company has in it file here 
that he is making· and has made in the courtroom and I asked 
him for it and he said he didn't have it and I have called 
upon Mr. Robert~on to produce it and I am entitled to it 
as evidenee in tbe cas~ and as material to this litig·ation. 
"The Court: Mr. \\·'·imams, what about the statute?' 
"Mr. Williams: He is n factor, he is the agent. 
'' (A. G. Robertson-Direct) (Transcript, p. 2B8). 
''The Court: He is not the litigant. 
''Mr. W"illiams: It is not a statement of any probative 
value, it is only a statement for purposes of contradiction. 
'' Tlhe Court : Contradiction? 
"Mr. Williams: Yes, that is all. 
'' The Court: Yon ask for it .for that purpose? 
'':Mr. Williams: Yes, sir. 
"Mr. Robertson: Mr. ,vmiams has no more rig·ht to de-
mand an opening· of my files for this thing than he has 
12~ *for anything else that may be in my files. I know 
of no right that he has to demand any · such thing·. as 
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that; I have never heard of it. He has no right to go into 
mv files for anv information he desires and I think that is 
tlie universal ruling of every court I have ever been in. He 
doesn't know whether this statement contradicts this wit-
ness or not. 
"The Court: The Court takes a different view, Mr. Rob-
ertson. The Court frequentlv calls on people who are not 
in the case to produce evidence that they have that may 
.affect the matter. Your file does not become inviolate be-
cause you are counsel in this case or for any other reason. 
'' (A. G. Robertson-Direct) (Tt'anscript, p. 239). 
You put this man on the stand. He has said he made the 
same statement in writing· that l1e did before the jury to-
day. Mr. Williams has a right to have that statement now 
pro<l:uced and calls on you to produce it. 
'.'Mr. Robertson: Now, if Your Honor please, I regret 
to do it, but I decline to produce the statement. 
'' The Court: You refuse to obey the ruling· of the CourU 
"Mr. Robertson: Yes, sir. I do that with the greatest 
deference and greatest respect, Your Honor, because I con-
sider it the duty to my client to do so and I think we might 
as well make a test of that at this time as anv other time. 
t decline to do it. .. 
13* *" The Court: Mr. Sheriff, will you ask the clerk 
to come in 1 Mr. Robertson, I will advise you before 
I act on this matter that if this Court makes a mistake on 
a question of law your remedy is in the Supreme Court to 
reverse this Court's ruling, but that you are at present de-
fying- the Court. , 
"Mr. Robertson: I realize that, Y.our Honor, and I think 
the Court has a rig·ht to fine me if the Court sees fit or I 
suppose the Court has a rig-ht to put me in jail 
"(A. G. Robertson--Direct) (Transcript, p. 240). 
if the Court sees fit. I realize that but, if Your Honor 
please, I wish to say this: I think I am acting under vir-
tually a threat and dure:::;s in demanding something I con-
sider inherently improper and unfair and I do not think as 
a man and in the discharge of my duty as a lawyer for this 
defendant that I have the right to comply with the order of 
the Court and I think I would be lacking in manliness and 
courage and character in what. I tllink is my duty if I ac-
quiesce in tl1e ord.er of the Court and therefore I have to de-
cline to do it with the greatest deference and regret. 
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'' The Court: Counsel l1aving refused to produce evidence 
that it has in its possession and ordered by the Court to 
produce it, the Cou_rt will now strike out the plea of not 
guilty of this defendant and will so inform the jury and 
then the ease will then go before this jury on the 
148 *question of the damages only that this plaintiff has 
suffered. In addition to that, the Court is of the opin-
ion that counsel has defied the Court and is in cqntempt. The 
Court will impose a fine of $100.00 upon counsel. . · 
"Mr. Robertson: ·when do you want that paid, Your 
HonorY 
'' The Court! You may pay it any time today. 
"Mr. Robertson: Mr. Vaughan, phone my office 
"(A. G. Robertson) (Transcript, p. 241). 
and ask them to send $100.00 up here in currency, please. 
The defendant Virginia Electric & Power Company ex.cepts 
to the ruling of the Court for the reasons stated. Now shall 
I contb;me with introducing my testimony1 
"The Court: Only with respect to the amount of damages. 
"Mr. Robertson: In view of th~ ruling of the Court the 
defendant Virginia Electric & Power Company excepts to 
the ruling of the Court and he feels it is his duty to the 
client he represents to produce tbe balance of the testimony 
he has in order that the damage to tl1e Virginia Electric & 
Power Company by the ruling of the Court may be minimized 
and therefore proceeds without waiving its exception. 
''Mr. Williams: Now, then, if Your Honor .please, do I 
understand that the Court has taken charge in the record 
of that statement for the purpose of the record t 
"The Court: ·what do you mean taken charge of it? 
"Mr. Williams: I m~an the statement is not produced. 
iiic,' The Court: The statement is not produced and 
158 I have stricken out the plea of not guilty a~d any other 
"(A. G. Robertson-Transcript, p. 242). 
defep.ses that the Virginia Electric & Power Company have 
offered. 
''Mr. Williams : There is anothe-r def enclant. 
"The Court: It cloes not affect the other defendant. 
''Mr. Robertson: The last statement of the Court en-
larges the former ruling of the Court and this defendant 
also e~cepts to the last statement of the Court, and I would 
like to ask the Court in the absente of the- jury is the Court 
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going· to state to the jury why the Court is doing what it 
doest 
'' The Court : I don't know that that is necessary .. 
"Mr. Robertson: I don't know what is the status of the 
case in view of your Honor's ruling·. I have never been con-
fronted with such a. situation before. 
'' The Court : The case will now proceed so far as you 
are concerned with only the amonnt of damages. The jury 
will be told that there is 11-0 plea or defense to tlrn question 
of liability by the defendant corporation and that they are 
proceeding as on a writ of inquiry to assess the damages 
against your company. 
"Mr. Robertson: May I ask this just for my 
16*' ti,, (A. G. Robertson) (Transcript, p. 243). 
own information? I want the record c·omplete Irnre. I 
have never heard of any such rule as that. Upon what basis 
is it that the Court strikes out my plea of not guiltyt I 
don't understand that. 
"'The Court: That any litigant who refuses to answer 
questions tlmt the Court rules proper may have his case-
dismissed or his plea stricken out and judgment-I think 
the statute says the Court may enter judgment. 
'''Mr. Robertson: The defendant Virginia Electric & 
Pow.er Company excepts to that ruling of the Court for the 
reason it has no basis in law and is contrary to the law o.f 
this State .. 
"Note: The jury returned into the Courtroom. 
''Mr. Robertson: 1\fa.y I ask the Court to take a few min-
utes recess! 
'' The Court; It is about time to adjourn for the lunch 
hour. Gentlemen of the jury, I excuse you until 2 :15 o'clock 
with the caution to permit no one to discuss this case with 
you or in your presence nnd do not visit the scene of the 
accident. 
''Note: At tl1is point the Court reeessed until 2:15 o"clock 
P. 1\f., at which time the I1eal'ing of testimony was resumed.,.,. 
'17* *Introduction of evidence in me case thereupon pro-
ceeded to conchrnion (Transcript, pp .. 244-t262); a;nd 
then the following- incirlents of the trial occurred in the ab-
sence of the jury (Transcript, pp. 263-277): 
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(Transcript, p. 263). 
. ' ' * • 
'' The Court: Any instructions, gentlemen? Exchange in-
structions, please. 
''Mr. Williams : Under the ruling of the Court I off er 
only the damag·e instructions. 
'' The Court: There are two defendants. 
''Mr. Williams: That is rig-ht. Due to the fact it will 
have to be re-arranged, it will be ag1:eea blc for me for Your 
Honor to instruct verbally if that is agreeable to Mr. Mon. 
cure. 
"Mr. Moncure: I have some. 
''Mr. Robertson: The defendant Yirgini;i Electric ~ 
Power Company reserves its objection and exception to eao4 
and every ruling against it by th(} Court l1pon the instruc-
tions offered and refused. The said defendant asks th&.t 
wherever the Court strikes out any part of any instructfop, 
thereby changing the sense of the instruction, th&t the 
words stricken out be either obliterated so thev cannot be 
read at all by the jury or that the instruction .. be retypeq.T 
Counsel for said defendant offers to have any necessary 
18* *" (Transcript, p. 264.). 
re-typing done. 
"In addition to all other grounds heretofore urged 
by this defendant against the ruling of the Court that this 
defendant was required to produce a statement by its motor-
man, counsel for this defendant invites the attention of the 
Court to the fact that the information contained in that 
statement is a •privileged communication which should not 
,be divulged and counsel for this defendant requests the 
Court to rescind its former ruling and also to rescind its 
ruling· upon fining counsel for this- defendant for contempt. 
If the Court overrules either of these request8; counsel for 
this defendant excepts for all of the reasons heretofore 
stated. 
"The Court: Right there the Court ·would like to state 
that this, according to its recollection, is the .first occasion 
it has been brought to its attention that that paper is a 
privileged communication. I clon 't think that was brought 
to the attention of the Court when you made your objection. 
If you are willing for tl1e Court to inspect that paper to 
determine that, the Court will entertain your mot.ion. 
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"Mr. Robertson: I find myself in this situa.tion, Your 
Honor: I am perfectly willing to do that if the Court will 
then retur~ the paper to me. 
rn~ ~,, (Transcript, p. 265). 
"The Court: Certainly. I am not going to keep the 
paper. 
"Mr. Robertson: I will be yery glad to do that. I might 
say there are two statements. 
"Note: Two papers handed to the Court. 
"The Court: Now, Mr. Robertson, if you will indicate to 
me here by pointing· it out the part you consider a. privilege 
communication. 
"IMr. Robertson: I consider it all privileged, every bit 
of it. You remember the statute says a witness shall not 
he impeached by any ex ~Jarte statement and the distinction 
the Court has already made-alwavs made between the 
party who is himself ;l witness and ·a witness who is not a 
party, all the trial courts that I know anything about have 
ruled that where the statement is bv a witness who is not 
a party it is not admissible. .. 
' ' The Court: Do yon want to say anything¥ 
''Mr. \Villiams: Yes: I don't think the paper is a privi-
leg·ed communication. TJ1e witness was offered as a repre-
sentative of· the company, the motorman, the factor, and 
he made a categorical statement that he made the same re-
port to the com1)any that he has made in testimony, and that 
20* *" (Transcript: p. 266). 
report becomes then a matter of verification, testing 
whet.her that motorman is correct or not as the factor. The 
Courts always rule that where the plaintiff or the defend-
ant-and he st.ands in the -shoes of the defendant as the 
actor, their testimony is aclmissible,-their statements are 
admissible. 
"Mr. Robertson: If Your Honor please, just to show you 
that is not true, it is the routine thing· in this court to have 
Mr. Alexander testify regarding· his inspection of street cars 
and it is the uniform tlJing· to exclude his report from the 
testimony, and those statements are in the same category. 
"Mr. Williams: 'Tihat is due to the fact Mr. Alexander 
is testifying·. If Mr. Alexander made a written report on 
one day and he testified today the car was all right and that 
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report sl10ws it was not all ri~ht when he made that report 
that report becomes abundant .evidence. 
'' The Court: That makes a difference and I would like 
to hear you gentlemen further. Had you taken this state-
ment and attempted to contradict their witness by it, you 
would have had to give notice. There wasn't anybody to 
~ive notice to but themselves and I have been thinking about 
that difference. I would like to hear from yon gentlemen 
21:!t .,, (Tr . t '>6,.,) anscr1p , p. ·-' , . 
further on that point. 
"Mr. Roberts·on: I will sav this, Your Honor~ "Take 
-these statements the witnesses give to representatives of 
the claim department and thf'n repudiate them, the ruling of 
-every trial court that I have ever been in construes the stat-
ute-I have got several numbers here, I am not sure which 
is which, but I think it is 621.6--there are three or four stat-
utes I am going to. bring· to the attention of the Court, the 
only ones I have had opportunity to look up during the lunch 
hour-every trial court in which I have ever tried one of 
these cases says that if the ex parte signed statement is g·iven 
by a witness who is not a party you cannot introduce it as 
,evidence. to impeach him but they sny if the ex pnrte signed 
·statement is given by a party to the suit and that party gets 
on the stand you can then introduce tha.t statement he has 
given to impeach him. So far as I know, the first court that 
beld that in any case I was in was Judge Crump 's. I think 
they take it as a statement airninst interest. I have never 
been perfectly clear. in my mind as t.o the ground upon which 
the Court makes those distinctions. 1 lmow all the trial 
courts do it. I am not sure it is a sound distinction, but I 
]mow an· the courts do it. I know I pas~ed it up to the Court 
-of Appeals twice and they dodged it both thnes and declined 
to rule on it 
'22* ~,' (Transcript, p. 268). 
and I don't think you can find a decision on it by the Court 
of Appeals in any Virginia case. 
"Now Your Honor raise8 a point there which, to my way 
·of thinking, makes all the difference in the world in the an-
·swer, that if Mr. Williams had this statement in his hand 
·out of his files and then undertook to contradic.t the witness 
against something that that ·witness had already given him, I 
think that would be one matter, but for him to claim that he 
has got a rigl1t to go into my files and compel me to open my 
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files to give him anything I have got in there when he doesn't 
know whether it is contradictory or not then he is :fishing, 
he is seeking discovery; it is nothing but a guess because 
he can'tlmow what is in my files. If Your Honor has a right 
to compel me to introduce that statement y:ou can compel rue 
to introduce anything else that is in my .:files. I do not be-
lieve there was ever a case tried that there was. not a con-
tradiction among the witnesses in a jury case; if it is not a. 
contradiction, it ought not to come into Court. L do not be-
lieve there ever was a case a jury investigated that there 
was not a contradiction. Some people say it was one person's 
fault, others say it was the other's. I don't s11ppos~ there 
has ever been a case tried where by the time the witnesses 
have testified there was not a contJ_·adiction. Before the wit-
nesses go on the stand I very fr~n]tly tell the Court ,vhen I 
interview 
23* *" (Transcript, p. 269') .. 
tl1e witnesses at my office I tell these witnesses what tbef 
said in their statements and I say: 'If your state-
ment is wrong- or if we have got you down wrong·,. 
"don~t you feel any embarrassment about. that at a.11; 
don't you think we have got you on the spot and are trying 
to turn the heat on you. You make it right whether it helps 
the company or not,' and they constantly change them. They 
change them very often and hurt us and we don't put that 
witness on the stand when they get here. They very often 
change them both ways and I ask the questions as well as 
I know how and as honestly as I know how. These motor-
men very often change their statements. I uniformly tell 
them·: 'I have no right to put you on the spot and turn 
the heat on you because you work for the company. You 
tell what is right and it doesn't make any difference whether 
we lose or not.' 
"It has never occurred to me to tell Mr. Williams he had 
to open his file and show me the statement that the plaintiff 
had g·iven llim. I won't labor the point, but I will say to 
the Court I feel as strongly and sincerely about it as any-
thing-I think more than anything I can ever recall that I 
have ever advanced in' Court. Now in the• lunch hour I 
looked up the section of the code which, without stopping to 
go hack to the code I ran't tell ·which is which, but they give 
light on it. One thing is ,vhen you have interroga.tories you 
.file interrogatories before the 
l 
., 
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24* *.'' (Transcript, p. 270). 
trial and if they are proper interrogatories and the Oonrt say8 
they should be answered and the defendant declines to auswer 
them, the Court may strike out the plea. If you will read that 
statute, it is addressed solely to the wrong·ful refusal of a de-
fendant to answer proper interrogatories. It is wholly statu-
tory and the whole thing is covered by the statute. The other 
thing there is about the statute which says you cannot c.ontra-
dict a man by an ex varte-
' 'The Court: Does the statute say unless it is taken after 
notice? 
"Mr. Robertson: It has that among other things. Then 
I come to this. I said verv franklv to Your Honor when 
you ruled that I had to make this .. disclosure for this de-
fendant that I did not feel that I could do so. I said that 
with deference and respect to the Court and still say it, but I 
say, and I am conscientious in thh:;, that I cannot ~onform 
to that ruling and keep my own self-respect and therefore I 
declined to do it and I say to the Court I think it is within 
the discretion of the Court to fine me for contempt or to im-
pose a jail sentence or both-I believe it is both, I can't re-
member the statute on that. It is two statutes on that; one 
puts a limitation of $50.00 fine on it and a jail sentence. Then, 
of course, it would be my privilege to apply for a writ of 
habeas corpus or mandamus 
25ci *" (Transcript, p. 271). 
or anything else I could think of to try and get out of jail. 
"Now let's assume that I am wrong and I should have 
complied with the ruling of the Court. That is a question 
between the Court and me; that is a question upon which 
I personally can appeal to the Court. I don't think that is a 
question where this defendant's entire defense should be taken 
away from it, and you say: 'All right, I will penalize and 
punish it for the misconduct of counsel; counsel is in the 
Court amenable to the discipline of the Court.' Now the de-
fendant may have been unfortunate enough to have had un-
wise counsel, but that does not affect the merits of that de-
fendant's case and it seems to me that if this Court has 
ig·ot any desire to mete out any punishment, that punishment 
should be directed against counsel individuaUy who is in-
dividually responsible if the individual conducts 11imself as 
best he knows how, anil should not be directed against this 
defendant and sav now: 'You have no defense' when anv-
one who has hear~d this evidence knows they have got a de-
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fense. It may not be a defense which will prevail, but it is an 
honest, legitimate, strong· defense. 
"I had one other thoug·ht there which has escaped me, but 
as I said before so fur as I know there are only two statutes 
I bave found in the limited time I have had that have got any-
thing to clo with taking away this defendant's defense before 
this jury and one statute is 
26* *"' (Transcript, p. 272). 
directed solely to the taking of interrogatories after the filing 
of them, and the other one is about those ex parte statements 
which the Court has already mentioned and I don't think it is 
necessary for me to labor the point. I think, for instance, if I 
had produced that statement here and questioned the witness 
about the statement on this, that and the other, I don't know 
whether he would have the right to call for that or not. I know 
on these ex parte statements by witnesses who are not liti-
~ants I have very often questioned them by using their state-
ments as a guide to me and very often had opposing counsel-
I think Mr. Williams himself-call for the statement and the 
Court says: 'The statement has not been offered yet and you 
have no right to go into a fishing expedition in opposing coun-
sel's file.' 
"I will talk about the instructions later. Those are the pre-
liminaries I wish to bring to the attention of the Court. 
"Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, the statute he has 
in mind has no relevancy at all to the matter we have in hand. 
This matter is a memorandum made by the defendant at 
the time and that memorandum becomes amenable to the order 
of this Court when it is available and can be called for by 
subpoena duces tecivm if it had ben developed it was available 
at tha.t time. If Mr. Robertson had had 
27* *" ( Transcript, p. 273). 
that in his file down at his office I could have asked the Court 
for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to bring it here. 
It is evidence in the hands of the defendant and, as a matter 
of fact, a refusal by the defendant to produce it is taken as 
a matter of law that it is against him and that could be done 
by the instruction of the Court. The Court could instruct 
the jury to that effect and that is the law. 
''Now that has been done dozens and dozens of times that a 
statement like that has been drawn from the records of the 
defendant in Court and tl1is is the first time I have ever 
seen a strong position taken by the defendant in the manner 
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in which it was and I think the Court is justified that our 
position is sound and that it is evidence which should be 
viewed by the counsel for the plaintiff. It is testing a wit-
ness on the stand offered by the defendant from his own 
records as to what he said the day it happened and what he 
says now may be different. He says it is the same today 
and we have a right to test it and it is a record we have a right 
to seek. There is no statute against it. · 
''Mr .. Robertson: The only other thing which occurs to me-
take, for instance, the rule which excludes evidence of repairs 
at the locality where an accident happened as to the accident; 
that is ruled out because they say 
28* *"' (Transcript, p. 274). 
everybody would be afraid to make any repairs after an acci-
dent, which would be against public policy. Take the rules of 
.any company for the guidance of its employees; they are uni-
versally excluded as I understand it. Now if these reports or 
statements are admissible in evidence, I think the same publie 
policy would apply and they would be afraid to make reports 
and just not make reports, just wait to see whether they 
would be sued or not and then say whatever they choose. 
That would be the effect of that. 
"The Court: This statute is in derogation of the common 
law. It provides that notice may be given the other party 
and if the statement is taken after the notice to the other 
party it does not come within the purview of the statute. 
Now had Mr. Williams taken the statement and Mr. Robert-
son put the witness on the stand and it had been taken after 
notice to the other party, the statute would have covered the 
case. Here is a situation where the party offering the witness 
Iias taken the statement without notice to the other party. 
Now he has offered that witness, has vouched for that witness 
before this Court as a truthful accurate witness and when it 
is attempted to show that that witness has made conflicting 
statements and that party has such statements in his posses-
sion that might show he had made them, then it is the duty to 
the Court and justice to let 
29* *" (Transcript, p. 275). 
that statement come to light. Under those circumstances, I 
think the other side has a right to waive the fact that had not 
gotten notice. This witness was offered by the defendant com-
pany as a truthful, accurate witness and when he was ques-
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tioned and attempted to show that he had by written statement 
made some other statement and the party who had that state-
ment refused to give it up, I don't think it is within the law-
within the statute. The question is close. These questions have 
to be decided by the trial court to the best the trial court can do. 
If the trial court is in error' then the higher court reverses 
it, but until reversed the trial court must be obeyed and any 
counsel refusing to obey the court, especially after warning or 
caution as was done in this case, that it was contempt to refuse 
to obey the order of the Court, the Court was justified in in-
flicting the punishment of a fine. 
"Now as to whether or not the litigant should suffer, the 
litigant is not an individual; it is a corporation that acts only 
through agents and its agent in court in charge of this case 
· and in possession of this paper is the one that refused to dis-
close it; then the corporation is responsible for the act of 
its vice-principal in charge of the case and the only way you 
can reach a corporation tl1at acts through agents that defy 
the Court is the agent. The Court will adhere to its ruling. 
The Court is g·oing. to give ' 
30* tc'" (Transcript, p. 276). 
this instruction-
'' Mr. Robertson; Let me make my exception. The de-
fendant Virgfoia Electric & Power Company excepts to 
the ruling of the Court upon all of the grounds heretofore 
advanced. Now will the Court let me have back my state-
ment? 
"The Court: Yes, sir. 
"Note: Papers handed back to Mr. Robertson. 
"The Court: I will state for the record that counsel after 
stating that the statements were privileged tendered them 
to the Court for inspection and the Court after reading them 
thinks nothing in them can be construed as privileged. 
'' Mr. Williams: And asked counsel to point out such matter, 
but he didn't do it. I would like the Court to add that to 
its statement because that is wliat you did. 
'' The Court: I think my statement covers it. Now I will 
hear your objection to Jnstmction 7-B. 
"Mr. Robertson: Counsel for the Virginia Electric & Power 
Company objects to Instruction 7-B upon the ground that it 
is erroneously predicated upon the fact 
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31 * *'' (Transcript, p. 277). 
that the Virginia Electric & Power Company has no defense to 
this case upon the merits and the instruction is therefore 
erroneous upon all the grounds heretofore urged against the 
ruling of the Court upon this phase of the case.'' 
In view of the rulings of the Court, c.ounsel for Goodson 
tendered n·o instructions other than damage Instruction No. 
7-b, and counsel for Thompson submitted no instructions what-
soever (Transcript, p. 297). 
Counsel for Virginia Electric and Power Company sub-
mitted Instructions A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M, 
which in the opinion of counsel for the Company would have 
been proper if the Court had not stricken out all the pleas 
and def ens es and all the evidence of the Company, but sub-
ject to exception of counsel for Virginia Electric and Power 
Company the Court refused all sueh instructions other than 
Instruction K upon the proof required of the existence of 
injury or· disability, and Instruction L to the effect that a 
verdict must not be influenced by sympathy. 
The Court itself wrote out and gave Instruction X, telling 
the jury that all pleas and def ens es, and all evidence in be-
half of Virginia ]Jleetric. and Power Company had been 
stricken out, and that the liability of that defendant was taken 
as admitted. 
Counsel for Virginia Electric and Power Company excepted 
to Instruction X upon the ground that it was predicated 
32* *upon upon a false premise, since Virginia Electric 
and Power Company was denying liability and protest-
ing against liability, and upon the further ground that the 
language of the instruction would mislead the jury (Tran-
script, pp. 281-2). 
The Court insisted, however, that the legal effect of its 
ruling was as stated in Instruction X as given. 
Counsel for Goodson in argument to the jury commented 
upon the evidence in behalf of Virginia Electric and Power 
Company which had been stricken out, and counsel for Vir-
ginia Electric and Power Company objected upon the ground 
that all such evidence had been stricken out and was, there-
fore, not subject to comment. Counsel for Goodson replied 
that he had momentarily forgotten such testimony had been 
stricken out, and the Court instructed the jury to disregard 
the comments of coun~e] upon such testimony. 
Counsel for :-Virginia Electric and Power Company moved 
for a mistrial on account of improper argument of counsel 
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for Goodson, but the Court overruled the motion and excep-
tion was duly noted (Transcript, pp. 286-7, ·292-3). 
After the case had been submitted to the jury, the jury 
expressed a desire to see a map (]]xhibit No. 10) which had 
been introduced in evidence in behalf of Virginia Electric 
and Power Company (Transcript, pp. 295-7). 
Counsel for Virginia Electric ancl Power Company o bject§d 
to submission of the map to the jury unless the Court per-
mitted all the evidence in behalf of Virginia Electric. and 
Power Company to go to the jury,.the ground of the objection 
*being that such evidence could not be both in and o·ut. 
33* The Court ruled, however, mter exception by counsel 
for the Company that the map might properly go to the 
jury to illustrate the testimony which had not been stricken 
out, and to aid the jury in determining· whether or not the 
defendant Thompson was liable (Transcript, pp. 296-7); and 
the Court submitted the map to the j-\.uy and instructed the 
jury verbally regarding the purpose for which the map was 
submitted to the jury (Transcript, pp. 296-7). 
Counsel for Virginia Electric. and Power Company objected 
and excepted to all verbal instructions by the Court upon the 
ground that the jury had already been instructed in writing, 
and that any verbal instructions would unduly emphasize 
the phase of the case upon which verbal instructions were 
given (Transcript, p. 280). 
The jury first retumed a verdict of $1,600 for the plain-
tiff, $1,500 against Virginia Elec.trie and Power Company, and 
$100 against Thompson (Transcript, p. 297). 
The Court thereupon instructed the jury verbally that a 
verdict could not be split, and if the jury returned a verdict 
against both defendants, that the verdict must be equally 
against both def endanjs, and if the jury could not agree as to 
both defendants, the jury must report that they were unable 
to agree ( Transeri pt, pp. 297 -8). 
Counsel for Virginia Electric and Power Company ob-
jected and excepted to this instruction of the Court upon 
*the ground that the jury might properly return a verdict 
34* against both defendants in unequal amounts under the 
decision in Rich1nonrJ, Or,oa-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., v. 
Andrews (1939), 173 Va. 240 (Transcript, pp. 278-9, 298). 
After the verbal instruction last mentioned had been given 
and the jury had retired to the jury room, Mr. George E. Allen 
called the attention of the Court (Transcript, p. 301) to Sec-
tion 4924 of the Code of Virginia, which provides : 
"\Vhen two or more persons are charged and tried jointly, 
a jury may render a verdict as to any of them as to whom 
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they agree, whereupon judgment shall be entered according 
to the verdict; and as to the others the case should be tried 
by another jury.'' 
Thereupon counsel for Virginia Electric and Power Com-
pany moved for a mistrial on account of misdirection of the 
jury by the Court; but the Court overruled the motion, and 
recalled the jury and instructed the jury verbally tha.t it 
might return a verdict against Vfrginia Electric and Power 
Company and disagree as to the defendant Thompson (Tran-
script, pp. 299-301). 
Counsel for Virginia Electdc and Power Company ob-
jected and excepted to the instruction upon the ground that 
it was an invitation by the Court to the jury to find a verdict 
:against Virginia Electric and Power Company and let the 
defendant Thompson go free, and the jury did eventually 
return a verdict of $1,500 against Virginia Electric and Power 
Company and in favor of the defendant Thompson (Tran-
script, pp. ·302-304.). 
35* *Counsel for Virginia Electric and Power Company 
thereupon moved to set the verdict aside as contrary 
to the law and the evidence, and for all the reasons assigned 
as errors throughout the trial of tl1e case; and the motion 
was docketed and continued for argiiment. (Affidavit of 
l\fessrs. E. R. Williams, T. Justin Moore, Norman L. Flippen 
.and Archibald G. Robertson). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The order of t11e Court direcfing petitioner to produce 
a statement which petitioner refused to comply with was un-
lawful and void for the fallowing reas-0n.s: 
(a) The statement which the order directed petitioner to 
produce was a previous statement in writing of a witness 
inadmissible in evidence under Section 6216 of the Code 
of Virginia; 
(b) The signed statement was a privileged communication 
which was disclosed in confidence to petitioner as counsel for 
Virginia Electric and Power Company. · 
2. The Court had no right or power to enter judgment 
against petitioner for contempt for refusal to obey an order 
which was unlawful and void. 
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THE QUESTIONS FOR DECISION. 
The real questions presented in the foregoing assignments 
are:. 
36~' *First: Was the judgment of the Court unlawful and 
void! 
Second: ·was petitioner guilty of contempt in declining 
to comply with an order which was unlawful and void 1 
THE THEORY O:B, PETITIONER. 
Petitioner contends the foregoing questions must be an-
swered in his favor. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
The facts of the case appear from the Preliminary State-
ment already made and from the ·proceedings in the Trial 
Court already reviewed. 
ARGUMENT. 
Before discussing the legal questions presented, it is not 
inappropriate to supplement the review of the ''Proce~clings 
in tl1e Trial Court'' with a brief comtnent on the action of 
the Trial Court in heavily penalizing Virginia Electric and 
Power Company, as a part of a judgment for contempt against 
petitioner, in striking out the pleas and defenses in evidence 
offered by Virginia Electric and Power Company. This 
37* was done *under purported authority of Section 6213 
of the Code of Vi rginfa, which provides: 
'' §6213. lf a party refuse to testify when required, suit dis-
missed, or vlea, etc., striwk ou.t.-If any party, required by an-
other to testify on his bel1alf, refuse to testify, it shall be law-
ful for the court, officer, or person before wl10m the proceed-
ing is pending, to dismiss the action, suit, or other proceeding 
of the party so refusing, as to the whole or any part thereof, 
or to strike out and disregard the -plea, answer, or other de-
fense of such party, or any part tliereof, as justice may re-
quire. (Code 1887, §3350.) '' 
This section of the Code is in derogation of the common 
law and must be strictly construed. The statute applies to 
any party and not to any witness. Its application to a varty 
and not a witness is further emphasized in the authority to 
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the Court to strike out and disregard the plea, answer or 
other defense of such party as justice may require. 
Section 6213 was brought forward into the present Code 
from the Code of 1887, where it appeared as Section 3350; 
and yet, so far as disclosed by Virginia Code of 1936, Anno-
tated, including the 1940 Cumulative Supplement, and so far 
as disclosed by Shepard's Virginia Citations, neither Section 
6213 nor Section 3350 has ever heretofore been invoked in any 
case which has been adjudicated in the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia; and it is difficult to see how justice re-
quires *that Vfrginia Electric and Power Company 
38* should be penalized in favor of Goodson. 
Virginia Electric and Power Company was deprived 
of all defense and subjected to the hazard of a $25,000.00 ver-
dict, when the Trial Court deprived the Company of all de-
fense and instructed the jury that the liability of Virginia 
Electric and Power Company was taken as admitted, and 
submitted the case to the 'jury, so far as Virginia Electric 
and Power Company· was concerned, solely upon the quantum 
of damage·s payable by the Company; and the Court made it 
possible for the jury to enrich Goodson unjustly at the ex-
pense of Virginia Electric. and Power Company. 
In this result it would appear .that the Trial Court was 
not acting with calm, dispassionate judgment. 
But whether or not injustice has been done Virginia El.ectric 
and Power Company is under review in the action entitled 
Benjaniin F. Goodson v. Vi.rginia Electric a.nd Power Com.-
pany and Frmwis X. Thonipson, and need not be determined 
here. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1. 
(a) The Statement Which the Trial Go1trt Directed Petitioner 
to Produce was a Previous Staternent in lVriting of a 
Witness Inarl?niss·ible in Evidence ,under Sec-
tion 6216 of the Code of Vir.(Jinia. 
39* *Section 6216 of the Code of Virginia provides : 
"§6216. Contradiction by vrior inconsistent Writ'llng.-A 
witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made 
by him in writing or reduced into writing, relative to the sub-
ject matter of the proceeding, without such writing being 
shown to him; but if it is intended to contradict such witness 
by the writing his attention must, before such contradictory 
proof can be given, he called to the particular occasion on 
which the writing is supposed to have been made, and he may 
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be asked if he did not make a writing of the purport of the 
one to be offered to contradict him, and if he denies making 
it, or does not admit its exeeution, it shall then be shown to 
him, and if he admits its genuineness, he shall be allowed to 
make his own explanation of it; but it shall be competent for 
the court at any time during· the trial to require the production 
of the writing for its inspection, and the court may thereupon 
make such use of it for the purpose of the trial as it may 
think best. The provisions of this section shall apply as well 
to criminal as civil cases. But this section is subject to this 
qualification, that in an action to recover for a personal in-
jury or death by wron.rlfitl act or neglect, no ex parte affidavit 
or statement in writing other than a devosition,, after due 
notice, of a witness as to the facts or circum,stances attendvng 
the wrongful act or neglect corn plained of, shall be used to 
contradict him as a witness in the case." (Italics added.) 
In this connection the Court said in Saitnclers v. Hall (1940), 
176 Va. 526, 537: 
''Under the :first part of Code, section 6216, a prior in-
consistent statement of a witness is admissible to impeach 
him if the terms of the statute are met. However, under the 
· last portion of the *statute a prior written statement of a 
40* witness may not be used to contradict the witness where 
the action is one to recover for a personal injury or to 
recover for death by wrongful act or neglect unless it be in 
the form of a deposition taken after due notice.'' 
Apparently the Court of Appeals has not yet determined 
whether the last part of Section 6216 excludes an ex parte 
statement in writing other than a deposition of a varty who 
is also a witness in his own case; but Section 6216 of the Code, 
like Section 6213, is in derogation of the common law and must 
be strictly construed, and .it is apparently for that reason 
that many trial courts have uniformly ruled that the statute 
does not apply to a party when he testifies as a witness 
(Recoi·d, p. 15); the statute being intended to apply only 
to ioitnesses who are not parties, and not being intended to 
apply to parties who have made prior inconsistent statements 
against interest. , 
And even if Section 6216 be construed as uot applying to 
the ex varte written statement of a party to an action, the 
statement which counsel for Virginia. Electric and Power Com-
pany declined to disclose to counsel for Goodson is not there-
by made admissible in evidence as the Trial Court ruled, for 
Section 6216 ex propriore vigore excludes the ex parte state- i 
I 
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ment in writing of the operator of a street car of Virginia 
Electric and Power Company when the operator of the car 
is not a party to the action. 
41 w *Since Section 6216 of the Code rendered the signed 
statement of the operator of the street car inadmissible 
in evidence, and the statement was a privileged communi-
cation made in confidence to counsel for Virginia Electric and 
Power Company, the order of the Trial Court directing pe-
titioner to disclose the statement to counsel for Goodson was 
obviously unlawful and void. 
As was said by :M:r. Justice Hudgins in Bitchanwn, v. Buch-
a,nam, ( 1938), 170 Va. 458, 477: 
''The general rule is concisely stated in Arnistron,g v .. 
Obiwino, 300 Ill. 140, 133 N. E. 58, 59: 'The doctrine that 
where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right 
to decide every question which arises in the ca.use and its 
judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally 
assailed, is only correct -when the court proeeeds according 
to the established modes governing the class to which the 
case belongs, and does not transcend in the extent and char-
acter of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is 
applicable to it.' See Windsor v. lJfcVei,qh, 93 U. S'. 274, 282, 
23 L. Ed. 914; Antho1iy v. Kasev, 83 Va. 338, 5 S. E. 176, 
5 Am. St. Rep. 277; Aetna Casualty &; Surety Co. v. Board 
-0f Supervisors, 160 Va. 11, 44, 45, 168 S. E. 617; J3ray v. La;n-
dergren, 161 Va. 699, 713, 172 S. :m. 252; W ats011, v. Mose, 165 
;v a. 661, 666, 183 S. E. 428. '' 
42* * (b) The Signed Statement Was a Privile.rJed Commwni-
cation Which Was Disclosed in Confidence to Peti-
tioner as Cownsel for Virginia Electric ancl 
Power O onipany. 
In Lyle v. Higginbotham, (1839), 10 Leigh (37 Va.), 67, 80, 
which involved the admissibility in evidence of letters ex-
changed between an attorney and l1is client, Judge Tucker 
said: 
''The first and most important question in this case is 
whether the letters from Lyle to l\I 'Cleland are evidence in 
the cause. The first objection to them is based upon the rule 
that an attorney at law will not be permitted to violate pro-
fessional confidence. But several things must concur to bring 
a case within the rule. The matter must have been one of pro-
fessional co,ifidence; it must have been at the time a secret, 
for if Im own to all the world there is no reason for farther 
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concealment; the disclosure must be in invit·ll,'m, as it respects 
the client; and lastly, if it might be forced from the client by 
the rules of the court, pari ratione it may be draw·n from the 
attorney." 
In Virginia-Carolina Cheniical Company v. Knight (1907), 
106 Va. 674, a report of an accident made immediately there-
after by a superintendent to his master in the line of his duty 
and before action had been brought, the report stating that 
an injured person was an employee of the master, was held 
to be admissible in evidence against the master in an action 
brought against him to recover damages for injury sustained 
in the accident; ·and it was held also that the report 
43* ""was not a privileged communication because thereafter, 
when suit had been threatened or brought, the report 
was communicated to the defendant's attorney. 
But in Virgi·nia-Oarolvna Chernical Co. v. Knight, no claim 
was made that S'eetion 6216 of the Code excluded the report, 
whereas in the instant case Section 6216 is specificallv in-
voked .and relied upon to exclude the operator's rep01:t. 
And since Section 6216 rendered the statement inadmissible 
in evidence, the statement by that very fact became privileged 
and counsel for Goodson could not have compelled its dis-
closure through interrogatories pursuant to Section 6236, or 
under s1ubpoena duces tecwm. pursuant to Section 6237, or by 
any other means. It was privileged under Section 6216 of the 
Code and it was also privileged because it was a confidential 
communication which was disclosed in confidence to counsel 
for Virginia Electric and Power Company. 
In Grant v. Harris (1914), 116 Va. 642, 648, the Court said: 
"It is conceded, and if it were not it is well settled, that 
confidential communications bet\-.veen an attorney and this 
client made because of that relation.ship and concerning the 
subject matter of the attorney's employment, a.re privileged 
from disclosure, even for the purpose of administering jus-
tice. See Parker v. Ca.rter, 4 Munf. (18 Va.) 273; Chahoon 
v. Com/th., 21 Gratt. (62 Va.), 822, 836-840; Tate v. Tate, 
75 Va. 522, 532-3; note to Collins v. H oofm.an, 26 Arn. & Eng. 
Aun. Cases, 1, 4, and Kelly v. Cwniniens, 20 Do. 1283, 1285-6, 
where the cases generally are cited.~' 
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44* * ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2. 
The Court had no Right or Power to Enter Ju.dgment J.4._qainst 
Petitioner for Contempt for Refusal to Obey G!Ji 
Order 111hich Was Unlawful and Void. 
S'ection 4521 of the Code enumerates the only cases in which 
courts and judges may punish smmnarily for contempt, Sec-
. tion 4521 being as follows : 
'' §4521. Cases in which cou,rts and fudges ·may punish su,m-
maruy for contempt.:--The courts and judges may issue at-
tachments for contempt, and punish them summarily, only in 
the cases following: 
''First. Misbehavior in the presence of the court, or so 
·near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the administration 
of justice. 
"Second. :Violence, or threats of violence, to a judge or 
officer of the court, or to a juror, witness, or party going to, 
a.ttending, or returning from the court, for or in respect of 
any act or proceeding had or to be had in such court. 
''Third. Obscene, contemptuous, or insulting language ad-
dressed to 01· published of a judge for or in respect of any 
act, or proceeding had, or to be had, in such court, or like 
language m;ed in his presence and intended for his hearing, 
for or in respect of such act or proceeding. 
"Fourth. :Misbehavior of an officer of the court in his 
official character. 
"Fifth. Disobedience or resistance of an officer of the 
court, juror, witness, or other person to any lawful process, 
judgment, decree, or order of the said court. ( Code 1887, 
§3768; 1897-8, p. 548; 1904, p. 309.) " 
It nowhere appears that petitioner was guilty of any of 
the offenses enumerated under the first, second, third or 
fourth classes, su.pra, and it follows that the Court eould 
45* *have only punished petitioner summarily for contempt 
under the fifth class, supra., and then only if petitioner 
was guilty of disobedience to a lawful order of the Court. The 
Court could not legaHy punish petitioner summa1~ily for con-
tempt if petitioner declined to comply with an unlawful order 
of the Court. 
As was said by the Court in Kelner v. Coioden CW. Va. 
1906), 55 S. E. 649, 651 : 
'' A void order is not mnde valid by lapse of time and ever 
remains without effect as completely as if never entered.'' 
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In Morris v. Creel (1816), 2 Va. Cases 49, it was held that a 
paper submitted to the executive council for the purpose of 
enabling it to perfol'm its executive functions and filed among 
its papers ought not to be withdrawn by the clerk without the 
order of the council, and, therefore, that no attachment should 
be awarded against the clerk for refusal to obey a subpoena~ 
ditces tecum, commanding him to bring with him that paper 
to be read ·in evidence in a suit between two individuals. 
In 16 L. R. A. N. S. 1063, the following case note appea.rs: 
"CASE N01.'E.-D,isobedience of void order as con.tem,pt. 
'' There is substantially no dissent among the courts to the 
proposition that a contempt of court, based upon failure of 
the contemner to comply with an order of the court, or upon 
his violation of such an order, must rest upon a valid order. 
It is equally well settled that, in order to make a valid order, 
a court must not only have jurisdiction of the person and 
subject-matter, but also power to make the particular order 
involved; that is, the order must be within the inherent power 
of the court to make, and within the issues of the cause in 
which it is made.'' 
46* *In 13 Corpus Juris, pp.13-14, the following statement 
appears: 
"(§14) 3. Vab:dity of J.Jfonda.te, Order, or Jud,qment.-a. In 
,General. Disobedience of a void mandate, order, judgment, 
or decree, or one issued by a court without jurisdiction of 
the subject-matter and parties litigant, is not contempt. *' * * '' 
And in support of the foregoing statement the following 
authorities are cited in the language quoted (pp. 14-17): 
(P. l~footnote 17-(a)) : 
"Thu.s, the violation of an order compelling a defendant 
to produce all his books for inspection on a mere suspicion 
that they might contain some evidence favorable to plain-
tiff, against positive evidence to the contrary, will not war-
rant a commitment for contempt, as it is clearly unauthorized. 
Ex. p. Clarke, 126 Cal. 235, 58 p. 546, 77 Am S. R. 176, 46 
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(Footnote 17-(f)): 
'' l,ivalid order notwithstancling jur·isdiction.-' It is a mis-
conception to suppose that only in a case where the oourt 
has no jurisdiction over the particular suit can one safely 
disobey the order of a court. A court may have jurisdiction 
in a general sense, of the particular suit, as regards both its 
subject-matter and the parties to it, and yet the court may 
make, in the trial of that partieular case, an order which~ 
regard being had to the nature of the suit, the court has no 
power whatever to make. Such an order is an absolute nullity1 
not a mere irregularity; and both where general jurisdiction 
at all to entertain the particular cause is wanting, and also 
where, such general jurisdiction existing, the court, in the 
. progress of the trial of the particular cause, makes an order 
wholly void, there is wanting utterly the predicate for any 
-contempt process for disobedience to such order. * * * The 
reason why one is not guilty of contempt in disobeying the 
-order of the court, passing on an unconstitutional statute, 
is not that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide 
whether the act was constitutional or unconstitutional, but 
because an order, made ~n pursuance of an unconstitu-
47"' tional statute, is a mere nullity, a thing beyond the power 
of the court to make. The court, of course, has the 
jurisdiction, generally, both ·of the subject-matter and of the 
parties in every such case, and the right-which is what juris-
diction means-to hear and determine the constitutionality 
of the statute; but if, in so exercising this jurisdiction, if in so 
hearing and determining that question, it decides tlie act to 
be constitutional when it is unconstitutional, and makes an 
<Order in pursuance of such decision which one disobeys, he 
is not guilty of contempt, not because the court did not have 
jurisdiction to decide the question rightly or wrongly, but be-
cause the order is absolutely beyond the power of the court 
to make.' McH en'rJJ v. State, 91 Miss. 562, 575, 576, 44 S. 831, 
16 L. R. A. N .. S. 1062.'' 
So also in 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 19, the following 
statement appears: 
"Disobedience of, or resistance to, a void mandate, order, 
judgment, or decree, * * * is not contempt, • 0 * , '' 
In support of the foregoing statement, Buchanan v. Buch-
ana;n (1938), 170 Va. 458, sitp1'a, is cited among other authori-
ties. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Petitioner is E-ntitled to Exoneration and Relief fro1n, the 
Fine Imposed 'ttpon Hlttn. 
The rule applicable in the proceeding under review is the 
rule which was. applied in fTT ells v. 001mnonwealth 
4811 (1871), *21 Gratt., 62 Va. 500, 507-510, where the Court 
said: · 
'' It is the duty of an attorney to be true to his client. 
Every attorney, before he is authorized to practice in any 
of the courts of this Commonwealth, must take an oath that 
he will honestly demean himself in the practice of the law, 
and to the best of his ability execute his office of attorney at 
law; and when he is licensed in this State, the oath of fidelity 
to the Commonwealth. It would hardly be· contended, that, in 
executing· the office of attorney at law, he could be required 
to violate the first branch of his oath of qualification, to de-
mean himself honestlv. It will not be contended that he could 
be required to do an immoral act, or an illegal act, or any . 
wrong, in order to subserve the interests of his clients. When 
Lord Broug·ham says, in his masterly and eloquent defense of 
Queen Caroline, 'separating the duty of a· patriot from that 
of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though 
it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in con-
fusion,' he speaks the language rather of the impassioned 
orator, than the cautious and well considered language of a 
judge. The duty of an attorney to his client cannot conflict 
with his obligation to demean himself honestly in the prac-
tice of law, or to be faithful to his country. If it did, he 
could not practice law in Virginia, because he could not take 
the oaths, if lieensed here, required of him. And I will be 
allowed to say in passing, I do not know why the Legislature 
inserted that proviso, 'if licensed here 1, in the oath required, 
of :fidelity to the Commonwealth. It seems to me that any law-
yer, who resides in Virginia, whether licensed here or not, 
should be required to take the oath of :fidelitv to the Com-
monwealth. But it is unquestiomtbly the duty ·of au attorney 
to endeavor, to the best of his ability, by his advice and coun-
sel, and by 11is conduct, to secure to his client every legal 
right and remedy to which he may think him even probably en-
titled; and if he fails to do it he is faithless to his trust, and 
should be held morally and legally responsible. And if he 
acts in good faith, if 110 demeans himself honestly, he is not 
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responsible for an error in judgment. 13ut it is of the utmost 
importance to the proper administration of justice, that he 
should be free and unembarrassed in the clischa rge of his pro-
fessional duty. But when a man becomes an attorney at law, 
he does not cease to be a citizen; and when he assumes the 
relation of attorney to a client, he is not absolved from his 
obligations as a man and a citizen. And it is the high moral 
principle and conservative sentiment whieh have ever actuated 
that honorable and useful profession *in Virginia, that 
49* has enabled it to perform so important a part, and de-
servedly, in moulding and giving tone to public senti-
ment, and in advancing the great interests of society. We 
hold that, as it is the duty of the client, so is it the duty of 
the attorney, and in a higher sense considering his relation 
to the courts, and in general his greater intelligence and 
capacity to appreciate its importance, to respect the authority 
and to maintain the lawful jurisdiction of the courts of justice. 
'For laws, without a competent authority to secure their ad-
ministration from disobedience and contempt, would be vain 
and nugatory.' 
'' An attorney, then, who would corruptly conspire with 
his client to obstruct the due administration of the law, and 
to bring the authority of a court of justice into contempt, 
by resisting and obstructing the execution of its lawful de-
crees, by whatever contrivance, even though it should be by 
procuring the interference of another court, whieh had no 
appellate or supervisory power, or jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of the suit, in abuse of its powers, to injoin and 
inhibit the officers of said court and other perscns from the 
execution or performance of said decrees, he is aL 
least as guilty of an offense against public justiC'e, and of a 
contempt of court, as his client, and as justly liable. to sum-
mary punishment. 
''But where, as I have said; the attomey has acted in good 
faith, although he may have erred in judgment, he is not 
liable. To vindicate his conduct, it is not necessary to be 
shown thnt l1e was right in his opinions. But it is necessary 
to be shown that ·he was acting· in good faith, for what he 
believed to be the interest of his client, and not froni dis-
respect to the court, or from a design to oust it of its lawful 
jurisdiction. And this, we think, is shown, by the affida,;rit of 
the plaintiff in error, in answer to the rule. 
"We think his affidavit clears him of the contempt: and 
, that must be taken as true. 'If the party can clear himself 
upon oath, he is discharged; hut if perjured, may he prose-
cuted for the perjmy.' 4 Black Com. 287. Again on page 
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288, the great commentator says, 'In the courts of law, the 
admission of the party to purge himse1f by oath, is more 
favorable to his liberty, *though perhaps not less dan-
50* gerous to his conscience ; for if he clears himself by his 
answers the complaint is totally dismissed.' And this 
exposition of the law on this subject is adopted by Stephens 
in his learned and valuable commentary; and we find no au-
thority to the contrary. . 
''We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Bedford, imposing a fine of $50 upon the said 
Henry H. Wells, must be reversed.'' 
So also in Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit and Trust Cor-
poration (1912), 113 Va. 612, 614, the Court said: 
'' The object of this proceeding is to punish the appellants 
for an alleged contempt, and it is criminal or qitasi criminal in 
its nature, and the rules of evidence applicable in criminal 
cases prevail. Mere preponderance of evidence is :not suffi-
cient to convict, but the offense charged must be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See Note to Wells v. 0 onnnonwealth, 
21 Gratt. (62 1Va. [Va. Rep. Ann.]), 893. So that the p~rties 
must be brought clea~·ly -within the terms of the statute (Va. 
Code, sec. 3768) before they can be punished summarily for 
contempt." 
For the foregoing· reasons petitioner submits he is entitled 
to exoneration and relief from the fine imposed upon him. 
Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally the reasons 
for reviewing the judgment of the Trial Court, and hereby 
adopt this petition as their opening brief in support of this 
petition. 
On the 9th day of June, 1942, copy of this petition, with 
notice that this petition would be filed with the Clerk of 
51 • the Supreme Court *of Appeals of Virginia at Richmond 
on the 10th day of June, 1942, was mailed to Mr. Thomas 
A. Williams, Attorney for Benjamin F. Goodson, Mutual 
Building, Richmond, Virginia; Virg·inia Electric and Power 
Company, Richmond, Virginia; Mr. L. S. Sachs, Attorney 
for Francis X. Thompson, Mutual Building, Richmond, Vir-
ginia; Mr. M. Vil allace Moncure, Attorney for Francis X. 
Thompson, Mutual Building, Richmond, Virginia; Honorable 
T. Gray Haddon, Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of 
Richmond, Richmond, Virginia; and Honorable Abram P. 
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Staples, Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, 
By E. RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, 
Electric Building, Richmond, Virginia, 
T. JUSTIN MOORE, 
Electric Building, Richmond, Virginia, 
Counsel. 
52,e: "'We, E. Randolph Williams and T. Justin Moore, at-
torneys practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
iVirginia, do certify that in our opinion there is sufficient 
matter of error in the record accompanying this petition to 
render it proper that the judgment complained of be reviewed 
and reversed. 
E. RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, 
Electric Building, Richmond, Virginia .. 
T. JUSTIN MOORE, 
Electric Building, Richmond, Virginia .. 
Received June 10th, 1942. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
October 8, 1942, writ of error and supersedeas awarded by 
the Court. Bond, $100. 
M.B.W-
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IN TRE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
· .A.RJCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in En-or. 
AFFIDAVIT OF E. R. WILLIA!fS, T. JUSTIN MOORE,. 
NORMAN L. FLIPPE1.~ AND ARCHIBALD H. ROB-
ERTSON WITH PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
E. R. Williams, T. Justin Moore, Norman L. Flippen and 
Archibald G. Robertson, all being first duly sworn, say upon 
oath: 
The allegations of fact set forth in petition for writ of 
error in proceeding entitled Archibald G. Robertson, Plaintiff 
in Error, v. Co1nmo1vt.oealth of Yir.(lini.a, Defendant in Error,. 
are true to the best of our knowledge and belief, and Tran-
script of the evidence and all proceecling·s upon trial Febru-
ary 12, 13, 1942, in Law and 1Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Part Two, of action entitled Benja1nfr1t F. Goodson v .. 
Virginia Electric and Power Company and Francis X. Thomp-
son, together with all Exhibits introduced in evidence and all 
Instructions given and refused upon trial of th,e Goodson 
case, are submitted as Exhibits with the af oresaicl petition 
for writ -of error; and .in our opinion the aforesaid Tran-
script, Exhibits and Instructions are pertinent to the pro-
ceeding- entitled Archibald G. Robertson, Pla.intiff in Error, 
v. Commonwwlth of Virginia, Defendant in Error, and 
should have been included in the record of that proceeding 
pursuant to original Certificate of Exceptions submitted to 
the Trial Cour~, which the Trial Court refused to sig·n. 
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The Trial Court excluded the aforesaid Transcript, Ex-
hibits and Instructions from the record of the proceeding en-
titled Archibald G. Robert.,wn, Plaintiff in Error, v. 
2~ Commonwealth of Vir,qinia, * Defendant in Error, but in 
our opinion consideration upon appeal of the original 
Certificate of Exceptions which the Trial Court refused to 
sig'Il, together with affidavit of Norman L. Flippen, setting 
forth the facts incident to refusal of the Trial Court to sig·n 
the Certificate of Exceptions, and consideration upon appeal 
of the Transcript, Exhibits and Instructions which the Trial 
Court excluded from the . record of the proceeding entitled 
.Archibald G. Robertson, Plaintiff in Error, v. Coninionwealth 
of Virginia, Defendant .in Error, will materially aid ,the Ap-
pellate Court in ·adjudication of that proceeding. 
The Transcript, Exhibits and Instructions which the Trial 
Court excluded from the record of tho proceeding entitled 
Archibald G. Robertson,, Plaintiff -in, Error, v. Omnnionwealth 
of Virginia, Defendant in Error, are lodged among the origi-
nal papers in the action entitled Benjamin F. Goodson v. 
Virginia Electric and Power Oonzpany and Francis X. Thomp-
son., now pending in Law and Rquity Court of the City of 
Richmond, Part Two, upon appeal by Virginia Electric and 
Power Company from a judgment in favor of -Benjamin F. 
Goodson against Virginia Electric and Power Company and 
in favor of the defendant Francis X. Thompson; and said 
Transcript, Exhibits and Instructions are therefore avail-
able to the Court of Appeals u11011 writ of certiorari from 
that Court to Law and . Equity Court of the City of Rfoh-
mond, Part Two, and in our opinion tl1e aforesaid Transcript, 
Exhibits and Instructions and also the aforesaid original 
Certificate of Exceptions tendered to the Trial .Court 
3* and the aforesaid affidavit of *Norman L. Flippen should 
all he considered by the Court of Appeals in adjudi-
cation of the proceeding- entitled ArchibaJcl G. Robertson, 
Plad1itiff in Error v. 001n1nonwealth of Virgi1~ia, Defend-
ant in Error. 
E. RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, 
T. ,JUSTIN MOORE, 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN, 
ARCHIBALD G. R.OBE.RTSON, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th clay of June, 
1942. . 
l\f y commission expires : Jan. 6, 1943. 
MA.RGARET TOLER, 
Notary Public. 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff in Error, 
vers1.ts 
COMMONvVEALTH 01~ VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NORMAN L. FLIPPEN vVITH PETI-
TION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
Norman L. Flippen, being· first duly sworn, says upon oath: 
On Anl"il 10, 1942, at 9 :30 o'clock A. M., I presented to Hon-
orable Frank ·T. Sutton, Jr., Judge of Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, an original Certificate 
of Exception~ which is now marked "Certificate of Excep-
tions Tendered to the Trial Crntrt,'' the Certificate being an 
Exhibit with Petition for Writ of Error to be presented to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in contempt pro-
ceeding· entitled Archibald a. RobP;rtson, Plamtiff in Error, 
v. Commonwealth of Virl}inia, Defe1ndant in Error. 
On April 10, 1942, at 9 :30 o'clock A. M:. I also tendered to 
Judge Sutton a stenographer's transcript of the evidence 
and all proceedings upon trial February 12-13, 1942, before 
,Judge Sutton and a jury in Law and Equity Court of the 
City of Richmond, Part Two, of action entitled Benjami1t 
F. (/oodson v. Virginia, Electric a.nd Power Company and 
Prancis X. Thompson,. tog-ether with photostatic copies of 
operator's report and of memorandum dated January 10, 
1941 ; the report and the memorandum now being desie;nated 
respectively "Exhibit #1" and ''Exhibit #2" with the rec-· 
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ord of the proceeding entitled Archibald G. Robertson, Plain-
tiff in Error, v. CornmonweaUh of Virginia., Defendoot in 
Error. 
2* * After argument at length in the presence of Messrs. 
Thomas A. Williams,, counsel for Benjamin F. Goodson,, 
and M. Wallace Moncure, com1sel for ~,rancis X. Thompson_, 
Judge Sutton indicated he would not sign the Certificate of 
E,xceptions tendered to him because it contemplated that the 
entire record of the Goodson case should be taken to the Su-
preme Court as the record in the contempt proceeding .. 
Judge Sutton stated that the only Certificate of Exceptions 
he would sign would include only those portions of the tes-
timony of the witnesses tT ones, Whitlow and Vaughan re-
garding refusal of Archibald G. Robertson to produce the 
operator's report, the testimony in full of Mr. Robertson, and 
all other matters regarding the controversy which ensued at 
the trial of the Goodson case because of the refusal of Mr. 
Robertson to produce the operator's report. 
After Judge Sutton refused to sign the ·Certificate of Ex-
ceptions I te~dered to him I redrafted the Certificate to meet 
his views and tendered the redrnf ted Certificate to him for 
his signature about 4:30 o'clock P. M. April 10, 1942. 
Judge Sutton noted on the original -Certificate of Excep-
tions I had tendered him that he had received it April 10, 
1942, and stated that he would sign the redrafted Certifi-
cate as soon as he had been able to review the entire tran-
script in the Goodson case to make sure there might be no 
omissions from the record in the contempt proceeding. 
About 2 :30 o 'dock P. M. on April 13, 1942, I returned to 
Judge Sutton's office and we discussed the redrafted 
3• -Certificate *of Exceptions I had prepared at his sugges-
tion and I requested him to amend that Certificate of 
Exceptions so that it would set forth the facts incident to pay-
ment by Mr. Robertson under protest of the fine -imposed 
upon him and also the facts incident to ,Judge Sutton's re-
fusal to sign the original Certificate of Exceptions tendered 
to him. · 
Judge Sutton refused to accept the original Certificate of 
E,xceptions and stated it was no part of the record . 
. I then g·ave him two additional pag·es which I requested 
him to incorporate in the redrafted Certificate of E;xceptions 
which he had indicated he would sign; the two additional 
pages reciting th~ facts incident to my tender of the origi-
nal Certificate of Exceptions to him and his refusal to sign 
it . 
. Judge Sutton read the two additional pages and stated 
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they were entirely correct in their recital of the facts which 
had transpir~d, but he stated he would not include the two 
additional pages in the ·Certificate of Exceptions he proposed 
to sign beGause he did not consider the events recited in the 
. two additional pages a part of the record in the contempt 
proceeding· . 
. I requested Judge Sutton to retain the original Certificate 
of Exceptions and a complete transcript of the evidence and 
all proqeedings upon trial of the Goodson case, together with 
the Exhibits and the Instructions granted and refused in that 
case and the redrafted Certificate of Exceptions with the 
two additional pages I had tendered to him; and I requested 
him to file or lodge the original ,Certificate of Exceptions, the 
transcript, exhibits, instructions and redrafted Certifi-
4* cate of Exceptions, including the *two additional pages,. 
with the original court papers in the contempt proceed-
mg. 
I explained to Judge Sutton that one reason for my re-
quest that the orignal Certificate of Exceptions and the Tran-
script, Exhibits, Instructions and redrafted Certificate of 
:FJxceptions, including the two additional pages, .be placed 
with the original court papers in the contempt proceeding 
was so that they might be available in the Court of Appeals 
upon writ of certiorari, if the sufficiency of the record of the 
contempt proceeding should be challenged there. 
Judge Sutton stated l1e thought it. was entirely proper 
for me to take the position I did, but would not agree to 
keep tbe original Certificate of Exceptions or the Transcript, 
Exhibits, Instructions or modified Certificate of Exceptions, 
including the two additional pages, ·among the original pa-
pers in the contempt· proceeding, since in his opinion they 
were no proper part of the record in that proceeding. 
,Judge Sutton stated that if the sufficiency of the record · 
of the contempt proceeding should be challenged in the Court 
of Appeals, he would he perfectly willing to go to tliat Court 
himself and state that the modification I had requested and 
the redrafted Certificate of Exceptions had correctlv set 
forth the facts; and .J udg·e Sutton insisted he had no desire 
to liamper an appeal in any manner whatsoever, but that 
he thougllt it would be improper for him to grant my re-
quest. 
I then went to tl.10 office of tlH~ Clerk of Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, and requested 
5* the Clerk to *allow me to file in his office the orio-inal 
Cer~ifi.cate of Exceptions a'!ld the Transcript, Exhibits, 
Instructions a.nd redrafted Cerhfieate of Exceptions, includ-
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ing the two additional pages, but the Clerk very promptly 
stated he could not agree to do so, since he would have no 
power to make either the original Certificate of Exceptions, 
or the Transcript, Exhibits, Instructions or the redrafted 
Certificate of Exceptions, including the two additional pages, 
a part of the record in the contempt proceeding. 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of June, 
1942. 





Pleas before the Honorable Frank T. Sutton, ,Jr., Judge 
of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, l1eld for the said City at the .Courtroom thereof 
in the ·City Hall on the 14th day of .April, 1942. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: .A.t a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, the 13th 
day· of February, 1942, the following order was entered: 
'' Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
For his contempt in refusing to obey the order of this 
Court this day while a witness on the stand, A. G. Robert-
son, a.n attorney duly qualified and licensed to practice in 
this Court and as such an officer of this Court, is :fined the 
sum of one hundred dollars and the ,Clerk of this Court is 
directed to collect the said sum a.Iid account for it as the law 
directs.'' 
And now at this day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, held the 14th day of 
.April, 1942. 
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Commonwealth of Virginia 
against 
Archibald G. Robertson. 
This day came A. G. Robertson, by his attorney, and on 
his motion his certificate of exception with two exhibits #1 
and #2 is now filed and made a part of the record 
page 2 ~ in this proceeding;· the same having been pre-
sented to the Court on the 10th of April, 1942, after 
due notice in writing to counsel for all other parties to the 
proceeding. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIONS. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Archibald G. Robertson. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIONS. 
I, Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge of Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, who presided over trial 
on February 12-13, 1942, in said Court of action entitled 
Benjamin F. Goodson, Plafo,tiff, v. Virginia Electric and 
Power Compatny a11z.d Francis X. Thompson, Defendants, 
when Archibald G. Robertson, counsel for Virginia Electric 
and Power Company, over his objection and exception, was 
fined $100.00 by said Court on the 13th day of February, 1942, 
for contempt of court, do certify that I refused request of 
the said Archibald G. Robertson to give bond with surety 
pending· appeal by him from said fine. 
This incident appears in full from the following extract 
from the Record : 
(Stenographer's Transcript of Record, pp. 293-295}: 
"1\fr. Robertson: I have another matter to take up with , 
the Court in Chambers. · 
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page 3 } ''Note : In Chambers. 
'' Mr. Robertson: I understand it is within the discretion 
of the Court that I shall either pay the fine the Court has 
imposed upon me in cash or give bond for the fine pending 
the final decision of this case and that the matter is within 
the discretion of the Court and I ask the Court to permit me 
to give bond for the fine pending· the final judgment of the 
case. 
''The Court: Where do you find that law Mr. Robertson t 
I would like to see that law. I was not aware of it. 
''Mr. Robertson: I don't know of any statute. ,I discussed 
it with, Mr. Randolph "'\Villiams and l\fr. Flippen during the 
recess and I got it from them. I hav~ not had any oppor-
tunity to look up any authority. 
'' T!he Court : I do not think there is any a.ppeal. The 
Court would be powerless if it could not enforce order and 
obedience to its rulings in the courtroom. My own impres-
sion is there is no appeal from it. 
''Mr. Robertson: .Some of them are appealable and some 
are not. I am going to find that out and I would like to refer 
you to the statute. 
'' The Court: I ask for authority. 
''Note: The deputy sheriff entered the Chambers. 
'' The Deputy Sheriff: Judge, the jury wants to know 
whether they should write two verdicts. I told them you 
would instruct them what to do. 
"The Court: Very well. I will have the verdict 
page 4 } put in form afterwards., 
"Mr. Robertson: On all of these things I have 
discussed I have these sections: 6216, 6236, 4521, 4524. 
'' The Court: If vou will read me--
''Mr. Robertson:., I am not concerned in that. I don't think 
it is anything in the statute as to bond in lieu of the cash 
payment. I am talking about appeal and we are not con-
cerned with that this afternoon. I have no statute as to 
whether the Court has power to give bond or not. I don't 
know and I haven't had opportunity to investigate the law. 
"The Court: If you find any statute that does, bring it 
to my attention. 
"Mr. Robertson: The Court has ordered me to pay the 
:fine today. 
"The Court: "'I will let you haye until tomorrow. 
"Mr. Robertson: No, sir, I expect to be out of town to-
morrow. I will just pay it. I would like to see whatever 
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J. H. Jones. 0. A. lfThitlow. 
order the Court enters and I would like to see it state that 
the fine was paid under protest and I except to the order of 
the Court. '' 
At this point Mr. Robertson walked out of the Judge's office 
without giving the ,Judge an opportunity say anything fur~ 
ther. 
The incidents attending the imposition of the fine appear 
from the following verbatim copy of what was said 
page 5 ~ and done at the trial: 
I I I 
1.! ' ';1 ! 
J. H. ,JONES, 
a witness introduced on behalf of Virginia. Electric and Power 
Company, testified in part on cross examination as follows: 
(Record, p. 77) : 
'"'Q. How long had that motorman been operating that cart 
"A. I don't have the least idea, Mr. Williams. 
'' Q. Wasn't it in his report how long he had been operatingf 
'' A. No, sir. 
"Q. Have you got his reportf 
'' A. I don't have it, no, sir. 
''Q. Can you get it for meY 
"l\fr. Robertson: No. I have got it and I am not going 
to give it to you because you have no right to it. 
'' Mr. Williams: That is all.'' 
0. A. "\vrIITLOW, 
a witness introduced on behalf of Virginia Electric- and Power 
Company, testified in part as follows~ 
(Record, pp. 94-95}: 
"Q. Now yon made a statement to tI1e office of how this 
happened, didn't you f 
"A. No, sir, I didn't. 
'' Q. You clidn 't make any statement to the office or report 
to the office f 
"A. I beg your pardon. I tl10nght you said officer. I did 
make a statement to the office. 
''Q. Now I ask you to get that statement and let me see it. 
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1.'. G. Vaughan. 
Mr. Robertson: No, you can't have it. I liave got it and 
I am too old for that sort of stuff. 
page 6 r Mr. "WIiliams: I will ask counsel not to interrupt 
the witness. He may make his objection to the 
court, but I don't think he can enjoin the witness. 
The Court: If this witness hasn't the statement in his 
possession, you can't make him bring it to you. If he hasn't 
got it, the Court hasn't got that power. 
Mr. Williams: Let me see whether he has got it. 
"Q. Have you got that report in your possession? 
"A. I have not, sir. 
'' Q. Do you know where it is? · 
'' A. No, sir. 
'' Q. You don't know where it is¥ You made it to the office? 
"A. That is right. 
Mr. Williams: Thei1 I will call on the office for it at the 
proper time. 
'' Q. Do you know what you said in your statement f 
'' A. No, sir, I don't remember." 
T. G. VAUGHAN, 
a witness introduced on behalf of Virginia Eledric and Power 
Company, testified in part on cross examination as follows : 
, (Record, pp. 234-235) : 
''By Mr. Williams: 
. . 
"Q. Mr. Vaughan, you have been sitting at the bar here 
with Mr. Robertson during this whole trial, haven't you f 
"A. I have. 
'' Q. And you have been prompting him from your file and 
the file in front of you with reference to it from time to time, 
have you noU · 
page 7 r "A. No, sir, no prompting from the file at all. 
"Q. Now do you have the motorman's original 
statement in that file? 
'' A. I do not. · 
'' Q. Where is it? 
''A. I don't know, sir. 
l\fr. Robertson: I have it. 
Mr. Williams: w· ell, I will just call you. 
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A. G. Robertson. 
'' Q. Will you get it from the file and let me see it. 
Mr. Robertson: No, sir, I don't expect to let Mr. Williams 
prove his case by my file.'' 
A. G. ROBERTSON, 
a witness introduced on behalf of Benjamin F. Goodson, tes-
tified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. You are 1\fr. Archie Robertson, c.ounsel for the defendant 
Virginia Electric & Power Company in this case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have the motorman's original statement in the 
file before you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you produce it and let me see it? 
A. No, sir, because I have a duty to my client and also y.ou 
have no legal right to call upon me for it and I consider that 
unfair practice and I will not give it to you. 
The Court : Do vou want to be heard anv fur-
page 8 } ther? · · " 
Mr. Williams : Yes, sir. 
Mr. Robertson: I· ask to be heard if the Court wishes to 
have any argument lly counsel. 
The Court: Yes, sir. Gentlemen of the jury, will you step 
out in the corridor Y 
Note : The jury retir~d from the courtroom. . 
Mr. Robertson: Now, if Your Honor please, do I understand 
I am forfeiting my right to argue this case 1 
The Court: Oh, no. You are not testifying voluntarily. 
You may argue the case. 
Mr. Robertson: Now Mr. "Williams is offering the evidenc.e. 
I think he should make his argument in support of it. · 
Mr. William~: If Your Honor please, this is the statement 
of the witness in the case who is the factor of the defendant 
and he has stated that he made the same statement in the 
original statement that the company has in its file here that 
he is making· and has made in the courtroom and I asked him 
for it and he said he didn't have it and I have called upon 
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1\fr. Robertson to produce it. and I am entitled to it as evi-
dence in the case and as material to this litigation. 
The Court: Mr. ·wmiams, what about the statutei 
Mr. Williams: He is a fact.or, he is the agent. 
The Court: He is not the litigant. 
l\fr. Williams: It is not a statement of any pro-
page 9} bative value, it is only a statement for purposes 
of contradiction. 
The Court: Contradiction? 
Mr. "Williams : Yes, that is all. 
'rhe Court : Yon ask for it for that purpose? 
Mr. Williams : Yes, sir. 
Mr. Robertson: Mr. Williams has no more right to demand 
a.n opening of my files for this thing than he has for anything 
else that may be in my files. I know of no right that he has 
to demand any such thing· as t11at; I have never heard of it. 
He has no right to go into my :files for any information he 
desires and I think that is the universal ruling of every court 
I have ever been in. He doesn't know whether this statement 
contradicts this witness or not. 
The Court: The Court takes a different view, Mr. Robert-
son. The Court frequently calls on people who are not in the 
{)ase tQ produce evidence that they l1ave that may affect the 
matter. Your file does not become inviolate because vou are 
counsel in this case or for any other reason. You put this man 
on the stand. He has said he made tlrn same statement in writ-
ing that he did before the jury today. Mr. Williams has a 
right to have that statement now produced and calls on you to 
produce it. 
Mr. Robertson: Now, if Your Honor please, I regret to 
do it, but I decline to produce the statement. 
T11e Court: You refuse to obey the ruling of 
page 10 }- the Court i 
Mr. Robertson: Yes, sir. I do that V{ith the 
greatest deference and greatest respect, Your Honor, because 
I consider it the cluty to my client to clo so and I think we 
might as well make a test of that at this time as any other 
time. I decline to do it. 
The Court: Mr. Sheriff, will you ask the clerk to come in Y 
Mr. Robertson, I will advise you before I ac.t on this matter 
that if this Court makes a mistake on a question of law your 
remedy is in the Supreme Court to reverse this Court's ruling, 
but that you are at present defying the Court. 
Mr. Robertson: I realize that, Your Honor, and I think 
the Court has a right to fine me if the Court sees fit or I 
suppose the Court has a right to put me in jail if the Court 
sees fit. I realize that but, if Your Honor please, I wish to 
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say this: I think I am acting ~ncler virtually a threat and 
duress in demanding something I consider inherently improper 
and unfair and I do not think as a man and in the discharge 
of my duty as a lawyer for this defendant that I have the right 
to comply with the order of the Court and I think I would be 
lacking in manliness· and courage and character in what I think 
is my duty if I acquiesce in the order of the Court and there-
fore I have to decline to do it with the greatest deference and 
re<>'ret. 
The Court: Counsel having refused to produce evidence 
that it has in its possession and ordered by the Court to pro-
duce, the Court will now strike out the plea of not guilty of 
this defendant and will so inform the jury and then 
page 11 }- the case will then go before this jury on the ques-
tion of the damages only that this plaintiff has suf-
fered. In addition to that, the Court is of the opinion that 
counsel has defied the Court and is in· contempt. The Court 
will impose a fine of $100.00 upon counsel. 
Mr. Robertson: \Vhen do you want that paid, Your Honor t 
The Court: You may pay it any time today. 
Mr. Robertson: Mr. Vaughan, phone my office and ask them 
to send $100.00 up here in currency, please. The defendant 
Virginia Electric & Power Company excepts to the ruling of 
the Court for the reasons stated. Now shall I continue with 
introducing my testimony? 
The Court: Only with respect to the amount of damages. 
Mr. Robertson: In view of the ruling of the Court the de-
fendant ;virginia Electric & Power Company excepts to the 
ruling of the Court and he feels it is his duty to the client 
he represents to produce the balance of the testimony he has 
in order that the damage to the Virginia Electric & Power 
Company by the ruling of the Court may be minimized and 
therefore proceeds without waiving its exception. 
Mr. Williams: Now, then, if Your Honor please, do I un-
derstand that the Court has taken charge in the record of that 
statement for the ·purpose of the record f 
The Churt: What do you mean taken charge of iU 
:.Mr. "\Villiams: I mean the statement is not 
page 12 r Piroduced. . 
The Court: The statement is not produced and 
I have stricken out the plea of not guilty and any other de-
fenses that the Virginia Electric & Power Company :ilave of-
fered. 
Mr. Williams: There is anotlrnr defendant. 
The Court: It does not affect the other defendant. 
Mr. Robertson: The last statement of the Court enlarges 
the former ruling of the Court and this defendant also ex-
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cepts to the last statement of the Court, and I would like to 
ask the Court in the absence of the jury is the Court going 
to state to the jury why the Court is doing what it does T 
The Court: I don't know that. that is neeessary. 
Mr. Robertson: I don't know what is the status of the case 
in view of Your Honor's ruling. I have never been con-
fronted with such a situation before. 
The Court: The case will now proceed, so far as you are 
concerned, with only the amount of damages. The jury will 
b~ told that there is no plea or defense to the question of 
liability by the defendant corporation .and that they are pro-
ceeding as on a writ of inquiry to assess the damages against 
your company. 
Mr. Robertson: May I ask this just for my own infor-
mation? I want the record complete here. I have never 
heard of any such rule as that. Upon what basis is it that 
the ·Court strikes out my plea of not guilty i I don't under-
stand that. 
page 13 ~ The Court: That any litigant who refuses to 
answer questions that the Court rules proper may 
have his case dismissed or his plea stricken out and judg-
ment-I think the statute says the Court may enter judg-
ment. 
Mr. Robertson : The defendant Virginia Electric & Power 
Company excepts to that ruling of the Court for the reason 
it has no basis in law· and is contrary to the law of this· State. 
Note: The jury returned into the Courtroom. 
Mr. Robertson: May I ask the Court to take a few minutes' 
recess T 
Tho Court: It is ahout time to adjourn for the lunch hour. 
Gentlemen of the jury, I excuse you until 2 :15 o'clock with 
the caution to permit no one to discuss this case with you or 
in your presence and do not visit the scene of the accident. 
Note: At this point the Court recessed until 2 :15 o'clock 
P. M., at which time the hearing of testimony was resumed. 
;Jic 
The following inc~dents thereafter occurred : 
Mr. Robertson: The defendant Viruinia Electric & Power 
Company reserves it objection and exception to each and 
every ruling against it by the Cour.t upon the instructions of-
fered and refused. The said defendant asks that wherever 
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the Court strikes out any part of any instruction, 
page 14 ~ thereby changing the sense of the instruction, that 
the words stricken out be either obliterated so they 
cannot be read at all hy the jury or that the instruction be re-
typed. Counsel for said defendant offers to have any neces-
sary re-typing done. 
In addition to all other grounds heretofore urged by this de-
fendant against the ruling- of the Court that this defendant 
was required to produce a statement by its motorman, counsel 
for this defendant invites the attention of the Court to the 
fact that the information contained in that statement is a 
privileged communication which should not be divulged and 
counsel for this defendant requests the Court to rescind its 
former ruling· and ahm to rescind its ruling upon fining coun-
sel for this defendant for contempt. If the Court overrules 
either of these requests, counsel for this defendant excepts 
for all of the reasons heretofore stated. 
The Court: Right there the Court would like to state that 
this, according to its recollection, is the first occasion it has 
been brought to its attention that that paper is a privileged 
,communication. I don't think that was brought to the at-
tention of the Court when you ma.de your objection. If you 
are willing for the Court to inspect that paper to determine 
that, the Court will entertain your motion. 
Mr. Robertson: I find myself in this situation, Your Honor. 
I am perfectly willing to do that if the Court will then re-
turn the pa per to me. 
page 15 ~ The Court : Certainly. I am not going to keep 
the pa.per. 
Mr. Robertson: I will be very glad to do that. I might 
say there are two statements. 
Note: Two papers handed to the Court. 
The Court: No,v, l\lr. Robertson, if you will indicate to 
me here by pointing it out the part you consider a privileged 
communication. 
Mr. Robert.son: I consider it all privileged, every bit of it. 
You remember the statute savs a witness shall not be im-
peached by any ex parte statement and the distinction the 
Court has already made-always made between the party who 
is himself a witness and a witness who is not a party, all the 
trial courts that I know anything· a.bout huve ruled that 
where the statement is by a witness who is not a. partv it is 
not admissible. ., 
The Court: Do you want to say anything? 
Mr. "Williams: Yes. I don't think the paper is a privileged 
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communication. Tl1e witness was offered as a represent-
ative of the company, the motorman, the factor, and he made 
a categorical statement that he made the same report to the 
company that he has made in testimony, and that report be-
comes then a matter of verification, testing whether that 
motorman is correct or not as the factor. The Courts always 
rule that where the plaintiff or the defendant-and he stands 
in the shoes of the defendant as· the actor, their testimony is 
admissible,-their statements are admissible. 
Mr. Robertson: If Your Honor please, just to 
page 16 }- show yon that is not true, it is the routine thing 
in this court to have l\fr. Alexander testify regard-
ing his inspection of street cars and it is the uniform thing 
to exclude his report from the testimony, and those state-
ments are in the same category. 
Mr. Williams: That is due to the fact Mr. Alexander is 
testifying. If Mr. Alexander made a written report on one 
day and he testified today the car was nll right and that report 
shows it was not all right when he made that report that re-
port becomes abundant evidence. 
The Court: That makes a difference and I would like to 
hear you gentlemen further. Had you taken this statement 
and attempted to contradict their witness by it, you would 
have had to give notice. There wasn't anybody to give notice 
to but themselves and I have been thinking about that dif-
ference. I would like to hear from you gentlemen further 
on that point. 
Mr. Robertson: I will say this, Your Honor. Take these 
statements the witnesses give to representatives of the claim 
department and then repudiate them, the ruling of every trial 
court that I have ever been in construes the statute---! have 
got several numbers here, I am not sure which is which, but 
I think it is 6216-there are three or four statutes I am going 
to bring to the attention of the court, the only ones I have had 
opportunity to look up during the lunch hour-every trial 
court in which I l1ave ever tried one of these cases says that 
if the ex parte signed statement is given by a witness who is 
not a party you cannot introduce it as evidence to 
page 17 ~ impeach him but they say if the ex parte signed 
statement is giYen by a party to the suit and that 
party gets on the stand you can then introduce that state-
ment he has given to impeach him. So far as I know, the first 
court that held that in any case I was in was Judge Crump's. 
I think they take it as a statement against interest. I have 
never been perfectly clear in my mind as to the ground upon 
which the Court makes those distinctions. I know all the trial 
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courts do it. I am not sure it is a sound distinction, but I 
know all the courts do it. I know I passed it up to the Court 
of Appeals twice and they dodged it both times and declined 
to rule on it and I don't think you can :find a decision on it 
by the Court of Appeals in any Virginia case. 
Now Y oui· Honor raises a point there which, to my way of 
thinking, makes all the difference in the world in the answer,. 
that if Mr. Williams bad this statement in his hand out of his 
:files and then undertook to contradict the witness against 
something that that witness Imd already given him, I think 
that would be one matfar, but for him to claim that he has got 
a right to go into my files and compel me to open my files: 
to give him anything I have got in there when he doesn't 
known whether it is contradictory or not then he is fishing, 
he is seeking- discovery; it is nothing but a guess because he 
can't know what is in my files. If Your Honor has a right 
to compel me to introduce that statement you can compel me 
to introduce anything else that is in my files. I do not believe-
there was ever a case tried that there was not a 
page 18 ~ contracliction among the witnesses in a. jury case; 
if it is not a contradiction, it ought not to come into 
Court. I do not believe there ever was a case a jury investi- · 
gated that there was not a contradiction. Some people say 
it was one person's fault, others say it was the other"s. I 
don't suppose there has ever been a case tried where lJy the 
time the witnesses have testified there was not a contradic-
tion. Before the witnesses go on the stand I very frankly 
tell .the Court when I interview the witnesses at mv office I 
tell these witness what thcv said in thP.ir statemerits and I 
say: "If your statement is wrong· or if we have got you down 
wrong·, don't you feel any embarrassment about that at all; 
don't you think we have got you on the spot and are trying 
to turn the heat on you. You make it right whether it helps 
the company or not,"' and they constantly change them. They 
change them very often and hurt ns and we don't put that 
witness on the stand when they get here. They very often 
·change them both ways and I ask tlw questions as well as 
I know how and as I10nestlv as I know how. These motorman 
very often change their statements. I uniformly tell them: 
"I have no right to put you on the spot and turn the heat on 
you because you· work for the company. You tell ,vhat is 
right and it doesn't make any difference whether we lose or 
not.'' 
It has never occurred to me to tell Mr. Williams he had 
to open his file and show me the statement tI1at the plaintiff 
had given bim. I won't labor the point, but I will say to the 
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Court I feel as strongly and sincerely about it aa 
page 19 ~. anything-I think more than anything I can ever 
recall that I have ever advanced in Court. Now in· 
the lunch hour I looked up the section of the code which, 
without stopping to go back to the code I can't tell which 
is which, but they give light on it. One thing is when you 
have interrogatories you file interrogatories before the trial 
and if they are proper interrogatories and the Court says 
they should be answered and the defendant declines to answer 
them, the Court may strike out the plea. If you will read that 
statute, it is addressed solely to the wrongful refusal of a 
defendant to answer proper interrogatories. It is wholly 
statutory and the whole thing is eovered by the statute. The 
other thing there is about the statute which says you cannot 
contradict a man by an ex varte-
The Court: Does the statute sav unless it is taken after 
notice! · 
Mr. Robertson: It has that among other things. Then I 
come to this. I said very frankly to Your Honor when you 
ruled that I had to make this disclosure for this defendant that 
I did not feel that I could do so. I said tha.t with deference 
and respect to the Court and still say it, but I say, and I am 
conscientious in this, that I cannot conform to that ruling and 
keep my own self respect and therefore I declined to do it 
and I say to the Court I think it is within the discretion of 
the Court to :fine me for contempt or to impose a jail sentence 
or both-I believe it is both, I can't remember the statute on 
that. It is two statutes on that; one puts a limitation of $50.00 
fine on it and a jail sentence. Then, of course, it would be my 
privilege to apply for a writ of hribeas corpiis or 
page 20 ~ mandamus or anything else I could think of to try 
· and get out of jail. 
Now let's assume that I am wrong; and I should have com-
plied with the ruling of the Court. That is a question between 
the Court and me; that is a question upon which I personally 
can appeal to the Court. I don't. think that is a question 
where this defendant's entire defense should be taken awav 
from it, and you say: "All right, I will penalize and punish 
it for the misconduct of counsel; counsel is in the Court 
amenable to the discipline of the Court." Now the defendant 
may have been unfortunate enough to have had unwise coun-
sel, but that does not affect the merits of that defendant's 
case and it seems to me that if this Court has got any desire 
to mete out any punishment, that punishment should be 
directed against counsel individually who is individually re-
sponsible if the individual conducts l1imself as best he knows 
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how, and should not be dfrectecl against this defendant and 
say now: '' You have no defense'' when anyone who has heard 
this evidence knows they have got a defense. It may not be 
a. defense which will prevail, but it is au honest, legitimate, 
strong· defense. 
I had one other thought there which has escaped me, but 
as I said before Ho far as I know there arc only two statutes 
I have found in the limited time I have had that have got any-
thing to do with taking away this defendant's defense before 
this jury and one statute is directed solely to the:, taking of 
interrogatories after the filing of them, and the 
page 21 }- other one is about those ex vartc statements which 
the Court has already mentioned and I don't think 
it is necessary for me to labor the point. I think, for in-
stance, if I had produced that statement here and questioned 
the witness about the statement on this, that and the other, 
I don't know wl1ether he would have the right to call for 
that or not. I know on these ex parte. statements by wit-
nesses who are not litigants I have very often questioned 
them by using their statements as a guide to me and very 
often had opposing counsel-I think Mr. "Williams himself-
call for the statement ancl the Court says: '' The statement 
has not been offered yet and you have no right to go into a 
fishing expedition in opposing counsel's file.'' 
I will talk about the instructions later. Those are the pre-
liminaries I wish to hring to the attention of the Court. 
Mr. vVilliams: If Your Honor please, the statute he has in 
mind has no relevancv at all to the matter we have in hand. 
This matter is a mem
0
orandum made by the defendant at the 
time and that memorandum becomes amenable to the order 
of this Court ·when it is available and can be called for bv 
subpoena d1wes tecwm if it had been developed it- was avail-
able at that time. If Mr. Robertson had had that in his file 
down a.this office I could have asked the Court for the issuance 
of a subpoena duces tecurn to bring it here. It is evidence in 
the hands of the defendant and, as a matter of fact, a refusal 
by the defendant to produce it is taken as a matter of law 
that it is against him and that could be done by the 
pag·e 22 }- instmction of the Court. The Comt could instruct 
the jury to that effect and that is the law. 
Now· that has been done dozens and dozens of times that 
a statement like that has been drawn from the records of 
the defendant in Court and this is the first time I have ever 
seen a. strong position taken by the defendant in the manner in 
which it was and I think the Court is justified that our posi-
tion is souncl and that it is evidence which should be viewed 
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by the counsel for the plaintiff. It is testing a wib1ess on the 
stand offered bv the defendant from his own records as to 
what he said the clay it happened and what he says now may 
be different. He says it is the same today and we have a 
right to test it and it is a record we have a right to seek. 
There is no .statute against it. 
Mr. Robertson: The only other thing which occurs to me-
take, for instance, the rule which excludes evidence of repairs 
.at the locality where an accident happened as to the accident; 
that is ruled out because they say everybody would be afraid 
to make any repairs after an accident, which would be against 
public policy. Take the rules of any company for the guidance 
of its employees; they are universally excluded as I under-
.stand it. Now if these reports or statements are admissible 
in evidence, I think the same public policy would apply and 
they would be afraid to make reports and just not make re-
ports, just wait to see whether they would be sued or not and 
then say whatever they choose. That would be the effect 
of that. 
The Court: This statute is in derogation of the 
page 23} common law. It provides that notice may be given 
the other party and if the statement is taken after 
the notice to the other party it does not come within the pur-
view of the statute. Now had Mr. ·wmiams taken the state-
ment and Mr. Robertson put the witness on the stand and it 
had been taken after notice to the other party, the statute 
would have covered the case. Here is a situation where the 
party offering the witness has taken the statement without 
notice to the other party. Now he has offered that witness, 
has vouched for that ·witness before this Court as a truthful 
accurate witness and when it is attempted to show· that that 
witness has made conflicting statements and that party has 
such statements in his possession that might show he had 
made them, then it is the duty to the Court and justice to let 
that statement come to light. Under those circumstances, I 
think the other side bas a right to waive the fact that he had 
not gotten notice. This witness was offered by tl1e defendant 
company as a truthful, accurate witness and when he was 
questioned and attempted to show that he had by written state-
ment made some other statement and i.he party who had that 
statement refused to give it up, I don't think it is within the 
law-within the statute. The question is close. These ques-
tions have to be decided by the trial court the best the trial 
court can do. If the trial court is in error, then the higher 
comt reverses it, but until reversed the trial court must be 
obeyed and any counsel refusing to obey the court, especially 
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after warning or caution as was done in this case,. 
page 24 ~ that it was contempt-to refuse to obey the order 
of the Court,-the Court was justified in inflicting 
the punishment of a fine. 
·Now as to whether or not the litigant should suffer. The 
litigant is not an individual. It is a corporation that acts only 
through agents and its ag·ent in court in charge of this case, 
and in possession of this paper is the one that refused to dis-
close it; then the corporation is responsible for the act of its 
vice-principal in charge of the case and the only way yon can 
reach a corporation that acts through agents tlmt defy the 
Court is the ag:ent. The Court will adhere to its ruling. The 
Court is going to give this instrnction-
Mr. Robertson:, Let me make my exception. The cle-
f endant Virginia Eleetric & Power Company excepts to tl1e 
ruling of the Court upon all of tbe grounds heretofore ad-
vanaed. Now will the Court let me have hack my statement? 
The Court: Yes, sir. 
Note: Papers 11anded back to Mr. Robertson, without conn-
!-iel for the plaintiff or counsel for the co-defendant, Franc.is 
X. Thompson being allowed to see them. 
The Court: I will state for the record that counsel after 
stating that the statements were privileged tendered them to 
the Court for inspection and the Court after reading them 
thinks nothing in them can be construed as privileged. 
Mr. Williams: And asked counsel to point out such matter,. 
hut he didn't do it. I would like tlle Court to add that to its 
statement because that is what you did. 
page 25 ~ The Court: I think my statement covers it. 
Now I will hear your objection to Instn1etion 7-B. 
I do further certify that tl1e forcgoin~ extracts from the 
StenogTapbic Tran~ript, with tlle original Exhibits, con-
Rtitute a true and correct copy and. report of all the evidence 
which ,vas eitlwr offered or introduced, as well as all of the 
incidents in any manner relating· to the imposition of said fine 
for said contempt, including all motions. ohfoctiom; and ex-
ceptions made or taken by the said Archibald G. Robertson 
in connection with the imposition of tlie said fine for said con-
temot, and of tlie action of the Court w-ith respect thereto. 
Tl1e original Exl1ihit # 1 which Mr. A. G. Robertson refused 
to produce w·as afterwards produced by him and another 
Exhibit #2 not theretofore referred to upon condition that 
the Court might irnmect the same and return 8aid Exhibits 
to liim. These Exllibits are identified by the initials of the 
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Court thereon and are marked "Exhibit 1" and "Exhibit 2 ", 
and may properly be transmitted to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia as a part of the Record in this cause in 
lieu of certifying copies of said Exhibits to said Court. 
I do further certify that Virginia Electric and Power Com-
pany and counsel for Benjamin F. Goodson, at the trial, and 
counsel for Francis X. Thompson, and the Commomvealth of 
Virginia had reasonable notice in writing from counsel for 
Archibald G. Robertson of the time and place when the afore-
said Stenographer's Transcript and Exhibits 
page 26 r would be tendered to the undersigned for sig·nature 
and authentication; and that the said Stenogra-
pher's Transcript and the original Exhibits were tendered to 
me on the 10th day of April, 1942, within less than sixty days 
after the entry of final judgment imposing said fine for con- . 
tempt of court, and are hereby made a part of the Record in 
this proceeding. 
Given under my hand this 14th da.y of April, 1942. 
(Signed) FRANK T. SUTTON, JR. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR., 
Judge of Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity Court of the 
City of Richmond, Part Two, do hereby certify that the fore-
going is a full and true transcript of the record in the above-
.styled proceeding-, with the exception of Exhibits No. 1 and 
No. 2 and that the attorneys for Benjamin F. Goodson, Vir-
ginia Electric and Power Company, Francis X. Thompson, 
the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond and 
the Attorney General of Virginia had due notice of tbe inten-
tion of A.G. Robertson to apply for such transcript. 
vVitness my hand this 29th day of April, 1942. 
Fee for record $9.00. 
LUTHER LIBBY 
Clerk of the Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Riclunond, Part Two. 
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IN 1fHE 
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
AT RICHMOND. 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
CO:MMON\VEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIONS TENDERED TO 
THE TRIAL COURT 
CERTIFICATE· OF EXCEPTIONS 
I, Frank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge of Law and Equity Court of 
the City of Richmond, Part Two, who presided over trial on 
February 12-13, 1942, in said Court of action entitled Ben-
jamin F. Goodson, Plaintiff, v. Virgvnia Electric ood Power 
Oomp0/11,y mu1 Francis X. Thompson, Defendants, when Archi-
bald G. Robertson, counsel for Virginia Electric and Power 
Company, over his objection and exception, was fined $100.00 
by said .Court on the 13th day of February, 1942, for contempt 
of court, do certify that I refused -request of the said Archi-
bald G. Robertson to give bond with surety pending appeal 
by him from said fine, and that the said Archibald G. Robert-
son pa.id said fine to the Clerk of said Court on the 13th day 
of February, 1942, under protest and subject to his aforesaid 
exception. 
I do further certify that the foregoing copy of stenogra-
pher's transcript, with the original exhibits, the copy of acci-
dent report signed by Odie A. ,vhitlow, the copy of sta.teinent 
made by him J nnua.ry 10, 1941, all as specified in said stenog-
rapher's transcript, and the order imposing the aforesaid 
fine, is a' true and correct copy and report of all the evidence 
which ,vas either offered or introduced at said tria.1; of all 
the instructions which were granted and refused by the Court 
at said trial; of all the incidents of said tria.1; of all the 
motions, objections and exceptions of the respective parties 
at said trial; and of the action of the Court with respect there-
to. 
I do further certify that all the original exhibits introduced 
in evidence, as shown by the foregoing stenographer's tran-
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script, have been initialed by me for the purpose of identifica-
tion and are as follows: 
page 2 r Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 (newspaper picture of 
street car and automobile) ; 
Exhibit VEP No. 1 (statement signed by B. F. Goodson); 
Exhibit VEP No. 2 (application for employment signed by 
B. F. Goodson) ; . 
Exhibit VEP No. 3 (picture of street car ,#501); 
Exhibit VEP No. 4 (picture showing inside of street car 
#501); 
Exhibit VEP No. 5 (picture of damaged automobile); 
Exhibit VEP No. 6 (picture of automobile skid marks and 
.street car wheel marks in street); 
Exhibit VEP No. 7 (sketch showing chassis of street car); 
Exhibit VEP No. 8 (picture showing automobile skid marks 
in street); 
Exhibit VEP No. 9 (picture showing street car wheel marks 
on street); 
Exhibit VEP No. 10 (map showing scene of accident). 
And all said original Exhibits may properly be transmitted 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as part of the 
record in this cause in lieu of certifying copies of said Ex-
hibits to said Court. 
I do further certify that Virginia Electric and Power Com-
pany and counsel for Benjamin F. Goodson, Francis. X. 
'l'hompson and the Commonwealth of Vhginia had reasonable 
notice in writing from counsel for Archibald G. Robertson 
of the time and place when the aforesaid stenographer's tran-
script, Exhibits, accident report, statement, order and instruc-
tions would be tendered to the undersigned for signature and 
authentication, and that the said stenographer's transcript, 
Exhibits, accident report, statement, order and instructions 
were tendered to me on the 10th day of April, 1942, within 
less than sixfy days after the entry of final judgment impos-
ing said fine for contempt of court : and the said 
page 3 } stenographer's transcript of the evidence, together 
with all the Exhibits mentioned therein, and the 
a.fore said accident report. statenient, instructions and order 
are hereby made a part of the record in this proceeding. 
Given under my hand this day of April, 1942. 
FRANK T. SUTTON. JR., 
J udg-e of Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Pa.rt 
58 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
IN THE 
SUPR.El\IE COURT OF APPEALS 0]~ "VIRGINIA: 
i\.T RICHMOND. 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
./ 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
EXHIBIT INSTRUCTIONS .. 
page 2 f Virginia ~ 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond,. 
· Part Two· .. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Va. Elec. and Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. X. 
Gentlemen of the jury, for reasons appearing proper to 
the Court all pleas ancl ot]1er clef enc es offered by the Virginia 
Electric. ancl Power Co. I1av-e been strick<?n out. All evidence 
heretofore submitted by the Yirginia Electric and Power Co .. 
fonding to sl10w it is not Iiallle for the injuries to the plain-
tiff is stricken from vour consideration. 
In this situation the liability of t11e Virgfoia Electric and 
Power Co. is taken as admitted and you are only required to 
assess the amount · of damage the plaintiff suffered by its 
failure to a.ct witll prope:r care for his safety as a passeng·er 
on its car. 
In addition to this vou are to determine wJ1ether the de-
fendant Francis X. Tiiompson is also liable to the plaintiff .. 
This you are to determine from the evidence, that is to say 
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whether tbe a~ts of the ~ijid ~hqmpsou showed lack 9f or-dinary -care on his part and. plqy~d. any part in causing the 
plaintiff's injuries. . . . ' 
Given 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
pag~ 3 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Va .. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRTJOTION NO. 7-b. 
The Court instructs the jury that one who negligently iµ:-
flicts a personal injl~ry on a.nother is responsible for ~11 the 
ill effects which, consiq.~ring the condition of beaHh in whic11 
the plaintiff was wlwn be received the injuries, naturally ~nq. 
necessarily follow '3uch injury and the defendants' liability 
is in no way affected or lessened by reason of the fact that 
the injuries would not ha.ve resulted had the plaintiff been in 
good health or that they were aggravated or re11dered nwre 
difficult to cure bv reason of the fact that he was not in 2:ood 
health; and in assessing- such damages agah1st the. Virgii1ia 
Electric and Power Co., defendant, yon sh911ld d9 sp with 
rflference to the evidence touching the following: 
FIRST: The mental and phy~fcal pain endured by the 
plaintiff; 
SECOND: The nature, character and extent of sucl1 in:: 
juries; 
THIR.D : Any medical expens~s ; 
FOURTH: Any sums which the plaintiff may have lost 
as a result of being unable to follow his usual affairs, or 
which he may lose in the future as a result thereof, and you 
should fix vour verdict at such sum as will fairlv and fullv 
compensate the plaintiff, but not to exr,eed the sum claimed 
in the notice of motion fot judgment. But the jury must not 
'&llow damage for any cause or condition that existed prior 
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to this accident. They may however allow damages for the 
aggra.tion· if any of a pre-existing condition. 
Given 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 4 ~ Virginia: . ~ . 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
.Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. -K. 
. - . 
The Court instructs the jury that you cannot award dam-: 
ages where you are unable to determine from the greater: 
weight of the. evidence whether or not an-alleged injury. o~ 
disability actually exist.~, or where you are unable to deter:: 
mine from the greater weight of the evidence the cause of an 
injury or disability, or where you believe from the evidence 
it is just as probable an injury or disability resulted from 
one cause as from another. 
Given 
F. T. S. ,fr. 
Feb.-13/42 
pag·e 5 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
V. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et nl 
INSTRUCTION NO .. L. 
The Court instructs the jur~r that you must consider this 
case solely upon the evidence before yon and the law laid' 
( : 
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~own in. the instructions. of the Court; and you must not let 
~ny sympathy you may feel influence your verdict. A ver-
dfot must not be based in whole or in part upon conjecture, 
or guess, or surmise, or sympathy, but must be ,based solely 
upon the evidence in the case and the instructions of the 
Court. · 
Given 
F. T. S. Jr9 
Feb. 13/42 
rpage ·6 } Virginia: 
, ., 
.. 
In the Law and Equity Court of the -city of Richmond, 
· . . · . Part ,Two.. l 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
'l,. 
Virginia Eleetric and Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. A. · 
·rhe Court instructs the. jury that it was the ·duty .or 
:Francis X. Thompson while driving eastwardly along Pat-
terson Avenue to exercise ordinary care to keep a proper 
lookout for street cars at Lafayette Street in such manner 
as to make such a lookout reasonably effective, .·and to .exer-
~isc ordinary care to oper~te his automobile so as to b.e. able 
readily to take all reasonable ·precautfons which an orclinary 
person of prudence might take to avoid a collision; and 
these duties were continuing duties, and were not necessarily 
discharged by the performance thereof at any particular mo-
ment o:f time; and if you believe from the evidence that at 
8 .. ny reasonable time before the collision, in the exercise of 
ordinary care on the part of Francis X. Thompson, in the 
proper performance of these continuing· duties, he could hav~ 
avoided the collision, and that he failed to do so, and that 
his failure to do so was the sole proximnte cause of the col- · 
lision, then the plaintiff caunot rec.over from the Virginia 
Electric and Power Company. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
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In the Law and Equity Court of th~ City o.f Hichmqnd,. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Part Two.. 
Va. Elec .. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO .. B .. 
The Court instructs tl1e jury if you beli~v~ frp~n tl1e evi-
dence that Francis X. Thompson approached- and entered 
the crossing at Li~.fayette Street at a sp~ed exceeding hyenty-
five miles per hom·: then he forf eitecl any right of way he 
might otherwise have had over the street car .. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr .. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 8 f Virginia :-
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmo:rid,, 
Part Two. · · ' · ' 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
'l'. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. C. 
I' • I 
The Court, instructs the jury that when the collision in-
•Volved in this case occurreq. tl1e tr~ffic law :pr·o~d~d; 
"§2154 (108}. Reclcless drivin_q.-Any pers~n who drives 
a vehicle upon a highway recklessly or at' a speed or .. in a 
r:µanner so as to endang·er or b~ ·uke~y fo endanger life, limb 
?r property of any person shall b~ guilty of reckless driv-
mg. :9 * * . . 
'' §2154 (109) Restrictions as to speed_: reclcle.ss dri-vin~q.-
(a} Any person driving- a vehicle on a highway ~hall drive 
the same at a careful speed not gTeater nor less tluin is r.ea.-
sonable and proper, having d~e regard to the tr{!ffi.c., surface 
and width of the highway and of any other conditions then 
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existing. Any person who shall drive any vehicle upon a 
highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb or prop-
erty of any person, * * $ shall be pri·ma facie guilty of reck-
less driving. · 
* 
:!(: 
" ( c) Reckless driving within the meaning of this section 
shall be deemed to include the following· offenses, which are 
expressly prohibited. ... 
"First. Driving a vehicle when not under proper control, 
or with inadequate or improperly adjusted brakes. 
I 
* * * 
'' Sixth. Exceeding a reasonable speed under the circum-
stances and traffic conditions obtaining at the time." 
And if von believe from the evidence that Francis X. 
Thompson~ violated any of the foreg·oing provisions of the 
traffic law, then his violation of the traffic law was negligence; 
and if you believe from the evidence that he was guilty of 
such negligence, and that such negligence on his part either 
proximately caused or efficiently contributed to any injuries 
the plaintiff may have sustained, without negli.;. 
page 9 r g·ence on the part of the operator of the street car, 
then the Virginia Electrie and Power Company is 
not liable. 
R.efused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 10 r Virginia.: 
Int.he Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. . 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. D. 
The Court instructs the jury if you believe from the evi-
dence that Francis X. Thompson was guilty of neglig·ence 
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and that his negligence was the sole, proximate and imme-
diate cause of the collision, then you should find your verdict 
for the plaintiff against the clef endant, Francis X. Thomp-
son, and. in favor of the defendant Virginia Electrfo and 
Power Company. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 , 
page 11 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
V. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. E. 
The Court instructs the jury tha.t the Virginia Electric 
and Power Company· is required to exercise the highest de-
g·ree of practical care for the safety of its passe.ngers, but 
it is not required to exercise such a high degree of care as 
to prevent the possibility of accidents. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 12 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of R.ichmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. F. 
The Court instructs the jury if you believe from the evi-
dence that the street car was being· lawfully operated and 
that it started over the crossing· at Patterson A venue before 
the automobile reached the crossing, then the street .car had 
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the right of way over the crossing, and it was the duty of 
Francis X Thompson to yield the right of way to the street 
car .so tha.t the street car might proceed over the crossing in 
safety. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 13 } Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Rfohmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. G. 
The Court instructs the jury if you believe from the evi-
dence that· 1Benjamin F. Goodson was injured without negli-
gence on the part of the operator of the street car, then you 
must find your verdict for the defendant Virginia Eleetrio 
nnd Power Company .. 
Refused 
F. T. S . .Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 14 } Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
fliffif11~!T- 1"T' F~i"';'"'rr-· ,- .~ 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
'I). 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. H. 
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff cannot re-
cover from the Virginia Electric. and Power Company by 
showing merely that if the operator of the street car had 
acted differently, perhaps the collision would not have oc-
curred. The burden is upon the plaintiff to show by a pre-
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ponderance of the evidence tha.t after the operator of the 
street . car actually realized the clanger of a eollision, or 
should have- realized the danger of a collision,· there was in 
fact a last clear chance for llim to avoid the collision by the 
exercise of the highest degree of practical care. It is in-
sufficient to show that there was a mere possibility that he 
mig-ht have done so. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 15 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Ricllmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
V. 
V 8 .• Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCTION NO. I. 
· The Court instructs the jury that the mere fact that Ben-
jamin F. Goodson was a passenger on the street car and that 
he was injured does not give him tlle right to recover dam-
ae:es from the defendant. Before he can recover from the 
defendant he must prove that the operator of the street car 
was guilty of negligence and that such negligence either 
proximately caused or efficiently eontributecl to his injury; 
and if he fails in such proof, yon must find your verdict for 
the defendant Virginia Electric. and Power Company. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 16 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of tl1e City of Richmond, 
Part Two. · 
Benjamin F. Goodson · 
v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
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INSTRUCTION J. 
The Court instructs the jury that you cannot award dam-
ages against the Virgfoia Electric & Power Company by rea-
son of1 the fact that the Court has fined counsel for said com-
pany for contempt of court. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
page 17 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
Benjamin F. Goodson 
v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. et al 
INSTRUCT'.ION NO. M. 
The Court instructs the jury if you believe from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from both de-
fendants, but that he is entitled to recover more from one 
defendant than from the other, then you should specify in 
your verdict the amount the plaintiff shall recover from each 
defendant. 
Refused 
F. T. S. Jr. 
Feb. 13/42 
A Copy,--Teste : 
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